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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the concept of Adaptive Joint Force Packaging (AJFP). Provided
2'rst is an overview of the concept itself, including the factors behind its development,
the manner and scope of its implementation, and the benefits proponents claim it will
bring. Also reviewed are the various concerns and criticisms that AJFP has created
within the defense establishment. Among those are reservations about the concept's
impact on unit integrity and doctrine, the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Joint Staff, training budgets, and traditional combat capability. Opposition
to AJFP also involves perceptions that it will create an additional layer of bureaucracy,
will conflict with other, uncoordinated, force packaging initiatives, will limit force-
employment options to a fixed .menu," and, finally, will never come to fruition. The
discussion of pros and cons on both sides of the AJFP debate is followed by an overall
analysis and evaluation. It is concluded that, on balance, the AJFP concept has
considerable potential for helping the U.S. military adapt to the post-Cold War
international security environment and smaller force structure. In particular, AJFP
promises to bring a greater degree of effectiveness to U.S. military operations at the
lower-end of the conflict spectrum, and allows the peacetime forward presence mission
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A new force planning and employment concept is now being developed which
attempts to address some of the more difficult challenges presented by the post-Cold
War security environment and attendant reductions to the U.S. military force structure.
This concept, known as Adaptive Joint Force Packaging (AJFP), intends to address those
challenges by "packaging" forces drawn from any or all of the individual Services into
new, and in many cases, unconventional combinations. One of many new functions
assigned to the revised U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM), AJFP has received
considerable publicity. However, the vast majority of that coverage originated from the
concept's authors and staunch advocates. As such, it is highly supportive and offers
few, if any, clues with respect to the concerns and skepticism that have been voiced
about the concept.
AJFP is a combination of diverse initiatives and ideas. It includes the idea of
packaging forces and adapting them to the specific environments in which they will
operate, thereby providing ox erseas combatant commanders and national-level
decision-makers with a menu of effective and efficient "tailored" options. The concept
also envisions providing designated commanders and staffs with mission-specific
training and exercises. This is to be done in an effort to familiarize commanders and
staffs with both the packages they will lead, and the missions they will be tasked with.
Finally, according to its authors, AJFP is oriented toward the lower-end of the military-
use spectrum.
The concerns that have been voiced about AJFP include the belief that it will (a)
disrupt the services' basic force building-blocks, (b) diminish the coordination and
oversight role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his Joint Staff, (c) add an
vii
additional, burdensome layer of bureaucracy, (d) lock the overseas CINCs into a limited
set of options, and (e) displace training budgets away from the services and overseas
theater CINCs. In addition, it is argued by some AJFP critics that AJFP's focus on both
non-traditional military missions and tailoring for forward presence is not only
impractical, but also imprudent. Finally, there is skepticism that the AJFP concept will
ever come to fruition, that it will be compatible with the overseas CINCs' need to plan
for specific threats and forces in mind, and will be coordinated sufficiently with the
Pacific Command's own force packaging initiatives.
A great deal of the most vociferous criticism of AJFP has centered on the concept's
initial force packaging experiment - the Theodore Roosevelt/SPMAGTF initiative. This
package involved a 600-man, 10-helicopter Marine force aboard a deployed aircraft
carrier. While much of the opposition to this particular episode appears to have
considerable validity and has resulted in the idea being "shelved" for the forseeable
future, it has, unfortunately, also caused some to provide a premature and unwarranted
"thumbs-down" to the AJFP concept as a whole.
Despite widespread concern and preoccupation associated with the AJFP concept,
as well as with many of the other changes introduced with the creation of USACOM,
these initiatives appear to have considerable, positive potential. In particular, they
promise to help the U.S. militarN both operate more effectively at the lower-end of the
military-use spectrum (in both traditional and non-traditional roles), and compensate
for increasingly smaller naval forces in the peacetime forward presence mission. Most
importantly, the initiative's introduction of an official "joint force integrator," with
formal responsibility for training and packaging joint forces, appears to be a step in the
right direction. It appears that this development alone will enhance the U.S. armed
forces' preparation to deploy rapidly and work together as a team, especially for
smaller, joint, and, in some cases, non-traditional operations.
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FORWARD
Lieutenant Bergesen has written an important critical analysis of the Adaptive Joint
Force Packaging concept. As we enter this new and uncertain post-Cold War world, in
which "threats" are less readily perceived and "risks" amorphously defined, domestic
support for defense spending is declining. Against this backdrop, the need to think
creatively about force structure and military strategy emerges as a pressing
requirement. Proponents of the Adaptive Joint Force Packaging concept argue that
many of our established approaches to national security decision-making no longer
apply to the new circumstances of the day. Therefore, they reason "tailoring" forces for
specific circumstances and environments makes eminent sense, especially as we down-
size force structure and expect our military to take on new roles and missions (like
Peace Support Operations and Humanitarian Aid) while retaining its traditional
defense/deterrence (combat) capabilities. This is an exacting challenge for today's
military.
In our rush to proclaim we are ready and do indeed understand the new
requirements of the post-Cold War world, there is a danger of going too far too fast in
the direction of change. Lieutenant Bergesen's thesis is a useful cautionary beacon in
what has become perhaps a premature race to demonstrate how much we have changed
in our approach to national security decision-making. He raises some important
questions about the AJFP concept - questions which need resolution, or at the very least
some greater clarity, before we move in a direction from which there is no turning back.
I personally believe that the AJFP concept holds great promise for the future
structuring of U.S. (and combined/coalition) forces. But there may be circumstances in
which the concept may fall short (in terms of bringing to a particular situation the
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capabilities necessary to performx a mission or to adapt to a rapidly changing hostile
environment). For this reason, and others that are explored in this thesis, we need to
consider more carefully the possible pitfalls that AJFP may occasion or confront. This is
why this work is so valuable and should be treated as an important contribution to the
next years' debates over force restructuring, defense guidance and military spending.
Jacquelyn K. Davis
Executive Vice President
The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
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1. INTRODUCTION
A national security policy that proved successful for forty years is not easily discarded. A
military organization that success' uly deterred global war, contained a militarily powerful
adversary, and projected presence for stability in regional hot spots, is not easily reoriented.
(Admiral Paul David Miller, in Both Swords and Plowshares.)
A. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE
In his February 1993 Report on the Roles. Missions. and Functions of the Armed
Forces of the United States, former JCS Chairman General Colin Powell stated that "[a]
new concept is being developed which envisions using geographically and missioned
tailored joint forces to conduct forward presence operations."1 This concept, known as
Adaptive Joint Force Packaging, or AJFP, is the focus of this thesis.
Offered as a way to maintain proven effectiveness while cutting costs, General
Powell explained that AJFP "explores the deployment of joint forces, configured to
complement one another, and meet peacetime and contingency operation needs."
Powell provided the following example: "a carrier battle group deploying to the
Mediterranean without an amphibious ready group might rely upon the Army airborne
task force in Italy to perform the ground tactical role in support of joint operations."
And similarly, "an amphibious ready group might deploy separately to 'the Med,' and
rely on Air Force land-based air assets, rather than on carrier-based naval aviation. As
such, the Chairman envisioned that "[fluture forward presence operations may thus
consist of specially tailored joint task forces that can maintain essential forward
presence at less overall cost."2
1 ColinL. Powell, Chairman of the loint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles. Missions, and Functions of the
Armed Forces of the United States (Wa.shington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), xviii.
2 Ibid., 11-8.
While the AJFP concept has been in the works for only a handful of years, and has
experienced only limited real-world testing, it was adopted formally on 1 October 1993
in conjunction with an official change to the Unified Command Plan (UCP). This UCP
change transformed the United States Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), into USACOM
and what some have called a "super CINC." Its commander in chief now controls the
vast majority of CONUS-based conventional forces and has been tasked with
developing, training and deploying AJFPs. The AJFP "model" has yet to be subjected to
rigorous analysis outside of tht closed-door, strictly military planning shops of the
Unified Commands, the individual Services, and the Joint Staff. This thesis intends to
correct this deficiency, and provide an "open" analysis of both the pros a=d the cons of
AJFP, and do so free from the political biases and organizational constraints inherent in
any internal DoD debate of this magnitude. No such comprehensive, critical analysis of
AJFP existed at the time of this writing.
More than anything, AJFP (along with its associated developments) promises big
changes in the way the United States military does business in peacetime, as well as in
the way it responds during crises. It will change traditional, in-grained patterns of
American military forward presence; it will alter the manner in which U.S. forces are
apportioned, allocated, trained, structured and employed; and it will transform the
formal and informal relationships between the Unified CINCs, the Joint Staff and the
individual Services. Some of the anticipated changes appear to have great merit; others
arguably less so. In any case, despite the many important changes AJFP will entail, it
has not received the attention it deserves.
A comprehensive critique of AJFP is both necessary and appropriate for a number
of reasons. To begin with, and as alluded to above, discussion and debate of the issue
have thus far been isolated almost entirely within the Department of Defense (DoD),
and have rarely surfaced outside the military community as a whole. In addition, the
vast majority of the statements that exist "in the public domain" regarding AJFP have
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come from from Admiral Paul D)avid Miller, his staff and, to a lesser degree, the Joint
Staff and the Chairman of the JC' (CJCS). Miller, the Commander in Chief (CINC) of the
Atlantic Command, has been a, perhaps Jbi key AJFP proponent. While this body of
evidence outlines a general conceptual framework for AJFP and USACOM's new role,
as well as some of the factors that precipitated the development of both, it is quiet on
the possible "cons." hi short, the "other side of the story" - if there is one - has yet to be
told, at least publicly.
The debate within DoD appears to have been somewhat less than adequate as well.
This may be inherent in the nature of military organizations; they demand loyalty,
reward consensus, and encourage subordinates to support the views and opinions of
their commanders. It may also be that, in the case of AJFP, this normal pressure against
open dissent was reinforced by reports that the concept's principal champion, Admiral
Miller, was a candidate to succeed General Powell as CJCS. 3
AJFP has also largely been ignored by the nation's academic and journalistic
communities, traditionally strong sources of opinions on all things military. The
reporting that exists, again provides little in the way of in-depth, critical analysis. It is
decidedly descriptive in naturc, and appears to mostly restate USACOM's already
published views on the matter. Some negative "leakage" has occured most recently
(primarily since the September 1f93 return of the Theodore Roosevelt battlegroup), but
nowhere can one find a public airing of the full range of concerns and objections that
have been voiced - quietly but firmly - about AJFP. This lack of critical attention by the
academic community and the general press is understandable, given the endless list of
post-Cold War issues which now demand investigation. It is perhaps unfortunate
nevertheless that AJFP has been enacted into law without the benefit of prior, outside
3The possibility of Admiral Miller becoining the next Chairman was articulated in numerous telephone
interviews, but was not substantiated b% any published statements, official or otherwise.
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critical analysis. Even so, AJFP is far from a final concept; its continuing evolution
means that this thesis should remain timely and appropriate.
B. SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH
If I have told you these details about the asteroid, and made a note of its number for you, it is
on account of the grown-ups and their ways. Grown-ups love figures. When you tell them that
you have made a new friend, they never ask you any questions about essential matteres. They
never say to you, "What does his voice sound like? What games does he love best? Does he collect
butterflies?" Instead, they demand: "How old is he? How many brothers has he? How much does
he weigh? How much money does his father make?" Only from those figures do they think they
have learned anything about him.
(Antoine de Saint Exupery, in The Lttle Prince.)
Athough AJFP is the focus for this research, it is only one of many new functions
envisioned for USACOM's expanded role. That role also involves command over a
large portion of CONUS-based conventional forces for the purpose of joint force
training; the institution of a more formalized, indeed centralized approach to joint
training itself; and designation as the armed forces' lead organization for peacekeeping
and defense of the continental United States. Save the last, defense function, each of
these other, non-AJFP aspects of USACOM's new role is addressed in this thesis, but
discussion is limited largely to their relationship to AJFP, and, in some cases, analysis of
the few specific objections that have been raised regarding them.
The thesis highlights what appear to be the most relevant AJFP issues. For the most
part, they are the ones that have created the greatest amount of controversy, generated
the most heated opposition, or alternatively, promise to precipitate the most drastic
changes. For better or for worse, virtually every aspect of AJFP has generated at least
some controversy, or promises to create fundamental changes. Consequently, AJFP
should be covered quite fully in this thesis.
The initial, internal-DoD debate over AJFP and USACOM's new role has prompted
a series of hard questions: Will AJFP work? Will it solve the problems which
precipitated its development? What changes to the military's standard operating
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procedures will be required if AJFP and USACOM's new mandate are to be fulfilled?
Will their application to the new challenges of rotational deployments and non-
traditional military missions so disrupt the way the armed forces do business that they
will no longer be able to fight larger, traditional conflicts effectively or efficiently? And
finally, will any costs generated by the anticipated changes outweigh the benefits
created?
These and many more questions are addressed in this thesis. In the final measure
however, and after all the pros and cons have been fully dissected and discussed, this
thesis needs to conclude with some sort of judgement. Accordingly, the purpose of this
thesis is not only to present the arguments on both sides of the AJFP debate, but also to
analyse those arguments and come to some conclusion about their ultimate validity and
worth.
There is one final note. As is the case with all research that addresses "real-time"
issues, it has been necessary to select a time at which to bar any new and additional
input - in other words, an "information cut-off date." It is recognized that this is
especially awkward given the nature of AJFP and its associated developments - i.e. with
constant evolution and adjustment the norm, and with theory just now being turned
into practice. Nevertheless, the alternative would be even more painful, and might even
jeopardize the successful completion of the project within the time constraints imposed.
Accordingly, an information cut-off date of 15 November 1993 was set. The risk, of
course, is that some of the data provided herein may be overtaken by events. Any
inaccuracies thus created are regretted.
C ORGANIZATION
Few can serve in that unique, five-sided structure with its 23,000 employees, its maze offloors, corridors, rings and offices - or even visit as a tourist - and not wonder how it all fits
together.
(Bob Woodward, in The Commanders.)
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This thesis begins with a summary of Admiral Miller and USACOM's vision of the
future: the new security environment; the challenges and opportunities created by that
new security environment and the downsizing of U.S. forces; USACOM's expanded role
as a joint force integrator; and of course, adaptive force packaging. This chapter not only
provides the conceptual background behind these new developments, but also some
insight into what AJFPs might look like, and how they are to be created and
implemented. Also discussed are AJFP's proponents' claims, i.e. the concept's alleged
advantages and efficiencies.
This preliminary description of AJFP seems necessary for a number of reasons. To
begin with, it appears that knowledge and understanding of the concept is, at this point,
less than adequate. For some, AJFP is nothing more than its first operational iteration -
the well publicized (and often criticised) deployment of the aircraft carrier Theodore
Roosevelt with a company-sized Marine contingent on-board. As such, many appear to
not grasp the full range of initiatives and concepts envisioned by AJFP's authors. As
well, the evolutionary nature of the concept means that it has, and continues to change
almost daily, and is worthy of an update. Finally, such a description appears
appropriate, insofar as it provides a suitable backdrop for the AJFP-related criticisms
and analysis outlined in subsequent chapters.
The description of USACOM's vision is followed by "the case against the vision."
Here, the concerns and criticisms that have been aimed at AJFP and USACOM's other
new functions, are summarized. Reported objections are detailed in an issue-by-issue
format, and are followed, in most cases, by this researcher's preliminary evaluation of
each.
The next chapter offers a general analysis of AJFP, including a more thorough
discussion of some particular aspects of USACOM's plan and the arguments against
them. In particular, it provides a look at what appear to be some fundamental,
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underlying themes and/or questions that accompany the on-going debate over these
concepts.
The final chapter presents the thesis' final conclusions about AJFP and USACOM's
new role. It weighs the likely positive and negative effects of the new concepts and
processes, and in doing so, also outlines the range of adjustments that appear to be
needed within the defense establishment if the concept of adaptive joint force packaging
and other USACOM changes are to be exploited to their fullest potential.
D. SOURCES
As each day passed I would learn, in our talk, something about the little prince's planet, his
departure from it, his journey. The information would come very slowly, as it might chance to
fall from his thoughts.
(Antoine de Saint Exupery, in The Little Prince)
This research has been hampered, from the start, by a lack of hard, "reference-able"
source material. As indicated, the AJFP concept is a relatively new, post-Cold War
initiative, with few if any precedents in U.S. force planning. This novelty, coupled with
the fact that USACOM's own views and opinions have been the only ones offered up
for public consumption, meant that the information needed for a thorough analysis of
both sides of the issue was not "on the record" and readily available. Nonetheless, the
task that this researcher set for himself required finding a way around this obstacle.
As noted, some of the basic conceptual framework and precipitating developments
for adaptive force packaging are laid out in Admiral Miller's many recent public
statements, in particular, his Both Swords and Plowshares: Military Roles in the 1990s
published in 1992.4 This and other statements articulating roughly the same concepts
have been used to develop the "USACOM's Vision of the Future" section of the thesis.
Because the Swords and Plowshares document discusses AJFP from a very general,
4 Paul David Miller, Both Swords and Plowshares: Military Roles in the 1990s (Cambridge: Institute for
Foreign Policy Analysis, 1992).
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conceptual perspective, that reflects little of the plan's most recent evolution and
practical, real-world implementation, more detailed information had to be sought out.
This includes personal interviews with USACOM planners and unpublished USACOM
briefings. Finally, the USACOM Implementation Plan (the so-called I-Plan) that
governed USACOM's transition and stand-up proved to be a useful source, in particular
regarding some of the preliminary mechanics by which AJFPs are to be developed,
trained, requested, and deployed.
The "other side of the story," i.e. the expressed concern and skepticism with
USACOM's new role and AJFP, was much more difficult to address. This was not
because reservations were few and far between, or buried beneath a pile of politically
correct rhetoric - they were not. In fact, it took no more than a few phonecalls to get a
sense that all was not well with AJFP. The difficulty of documenting the other side of
the story resided in the fact that most of the concerns expressed so readily over the
phone have not been written down. They are not found, for example, in prominent
professional journals such as Joint Force Ouarterly, lane's Defense Weekly, Armed
Forces Tournal International, the United States Naval Institute Proceedings Nam.ITime,
etc. This lack of "negative" attention contrasts sharply with the publicity given to those
who favor AJFP; their views have graced the pages of the above-mentioned
publications.
Not only were criticisms of AJFP more difficult to tap into because of a lack of
publication, they were also, to a large extent "unattributable." Although the military
planners interviewed for this study were quite prepared to vocalize their reservations,
many preferred to do so only on the condition of anonymity. In some cases,
interviewees indicated that their personal views did not necessarily reflect the official
views of their respective commands or commanding officers. Many of the statements
generated during those interviews must therefore be treated delicately, and may be
presented only without specific, detailed attribution.
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In order to present the widest possible range of views and opinions on AJFP,
interviews were conducted with staff officers from the following commands: USACOM,
the Joint Staff, the Navy Staff, the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the
United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), the United States European Command
(USEUCOM), the Air Force's Air Combat Command (ACC), and the Army's Forces
Command (FORSCOM). The people interviewed, either in-person or over the
telephone, were generally planning officers (i.e. J-5/N-5) or current operations officers
(i.e. J-3/N-3). Interestingly, the shop handling most of the development of AJFP at
USACOM is J-3 Ops, and not J-5 Plans and Policy. Finally, interviews were also
conducted with military planners outside the operational and administrative chain; i.e.
at academic institutions such as the Army and Naval War Colleges and the Army, Navy
and Air Force doctrine centers.
The one "gold mine" of documented information that came into the author's
possession on individual Service and Unified Command concerns about adaptive force
packaging was a report entitled Major Points and Analysis: First Adaptive Ioint Force
Forward Presence Conference 6-9 Oct 92. That report highlighted an apparent lack of
concensus among the Unified CINCs, the individual Services, and the Joint Staff about
what force packaging is, what forward presence is, the distinction between peacetime
and crisis-response forward presence, the benefits and costs of force packaging, etc. This
document is almost the QnJy hard-copy, fully-attributable source for opposing points of
view. Its content has been utilized extensively in this thesis.
The foregoing difficulties aside, there is nevertheless a number of AJFP-relevant
issues, concepts, or topics that have received a great deal of literary coverage. In
particular, forward presence and non-traditional military missions (peacekeeping,
humanitarian assistance, etc.) have been written about extensively, and recently. This
coverage is used and referenced is needed throughout the thesis as well.
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II. USACOM'S VISION OF THE FUTURE
Today, the world which we had grown so accustomed to is gone with the wind. Instead, we
now function in an environment of challenges and dangers placing new demands on the United
States. America's ability to match it• diverse commitments with limited resourses is calling into
question many of our established beliefs and traditional approaches to national security.
(Admiral Paul David Miller, speaking before the Pacific Southwest Navy League)5
The October 1993 revision to the UCP merged FORSCOM, ACC, the Marine Corps'
Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT), and the Navy's Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT)
into a single unified combatant command named USACOM. This command is
responsible not only for traditional, regional force employment commitments, but also -
and more importantly - for joint force integration and training. As well, USACOM has
become DoD's lead organization for peace-support operations.
Consistent with General Powell's recommendations, the former LANTCOM was the
basis for the new command.6 Because the Navy and Marine Corps organizations were
already LANTCOM components, their status did not change drastically. Conversely,
the UCP change signaled a significant adjustment for the Army and Air Force
organizations. Although the ACC and FORSCOM commands had been "force-
providers" for the Atlantic Command in the past, the new relationship will be decidedly
different. Under the new regime, USACOM has direct combatant command of these
organizations and the forces under them. As a result, USACOM will have the authority
to directly task those forces, without having to go through the JCS or Service Staffs, as
was formerly the case. 7 In addition, the actual USACOM Commander-in-Chief billet
5 Paul David Miller, Remarks before the Pacific Southwest Navy League, Los Angeles, California on 8
October 1993.
6Powell, Roles and Missions, xii.
7This, of course, does not apply to depl, ,ying those forces overseas, an activity that remains under the
control of the civilian National Command Authority; i.e. all deployment orders must still be signed by the
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will now be what is called a "nominative" position, i.e. fillable by a four-star officer
from any one of the services. This, of course, is a break with the Atlantic Command's
historic and predominantly naval character.
AJFP is the one aspect of USACOM's new role which has generated the most
controversy. This initiative has been characterized as a way to better organize and train
forces to support the theater CINCs (the "supported" CINCs) more effectively and more
efficiently, and make it easier to call forward the specific capabilities required in their
respective areas of responsibility (AORs).8 USACOM's first Commander-in-Chief,
Admiral Miller, has distinguished between "packaging" and "adapting" AJFP
capabilities. "Packaging" forces appears to mean combining forces from one or more of
the individual services into traditional, or new and innovative groupings so that the
resulting "packages" can train and deploy together, and arrive at their destination ready
to operate effectively in a joint environment. "Adapting" forces, on the other hand,
apparently refers to "tailoring" packages to meet the specific requirements of a given
CINC's AOR, or a particular crisis situation or mission.
In Both Swords and Plowshares, Miller also indicated that the individual services
have already taken some steps to reorganize their forces along different, more
appropriate lines. These initiatives are, in part, an effort to make the forces more
flexible, thereby creating more options for defense planners and national decision-
makers. Others are intended to make the forces more responsive to operational needs
by more closely aligning peacetime training responsibilities with operational command
structures. While not necessarilN, tied directly to AJFP's development, it is likely that
many of these steps will facilitate the AJFP process.
President or the Secretary of Defense.
8 Miller, Both Swords and PlowshareS, 2 7.
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Miller has pointed to maritime forces as a useful example of how force packages can
be adapted to specific theater requirements. In doing so, he has also highlighted how
different regions may require different capabilities. According to the Admiral:
"In today's fast-changing world a naval force may not need the same capabilities
in one region or situation as in another. One CINC may desire to augment the
offensive firepower of an aircraft carrier by varying the mix of strike aircraft in the
embarked wing. Another CINC may choose to modify the capabilities of the
carrier by reducing the number of naval aircraft and instead embarking Special
Operations Forces (SOF) or a special purpose Marine force with capabilities
tailored to specific theater requirements. Circumstances in a third region may be
such that requirements ':an be met with a tailored Marine Amphibious Ready
Group (MARG) supported by Tomahawk cruise missile-firing ships and
submarines. In each case the capabilities are tailored to meet CINC
requirements. " 9
The Air Force has made changes as well. In particular, it has formalized its concept
of the "composite air wing," which combines aircraft of many types in a single wing;
bombers, fighters, electronic jammers, refuelers, etc. The composite airwing is not a new
concept per se; it was used in the past, most recently to support operations "Proven
Force" and "Southern Watch."1 " In both cases however, the organization appears to
have been somewhat ad-hoc, and put together under conditions of considerable
urgency. A new vision calls instead for the maintenance of these composite airwings
during peacetime - located for the most part at a single site, training together regularly,
and ready to deploy to a crisis spot at a moment's notice.11 Before getting entangled
however, in the wide-range ot supporting details associated with adaptive force
packaging, it is desireable to first provide some essential background, such as the
91bid., 29.
10
"Proven Force" refers to that portion of the "Desert Storm" air campaign that was run out of Turkey,
while "Southern Watch" was the United States' contribution to enforcing the UN-mandated no-fly zone in
southern Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War.
11For more information on the Composite Airwing concept, see Julie Bird, "Anywhere, anytime:
Intervention wing deploys," Air Force Times 29 March 1993, 12., and Brig Gen Lee A. Downer, USAF,
"The Composite Wing In Combat," Airpower loumal (Winter 1991): 4.
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fundamental why behind the concept's creation, as well as the basics of its development
and envisioned pattern of implementation.
A. THE NEED FOR DOING THINGS DIFFERENTLY
Four key factors - the end of tlbe Cold War, budgetary constraints, the Goldwater-Nichols
Act, and the press of new regional -rises - converged to provide the opportunity, the necessity,
and the authority to address the ways in which all four Sevices are structured, trained, and
employed in combat. As a result, mvre changes have occured in the US military in the past three
years than in any similar period sirn e the National Security Act of 1947.
(Colin L. Powell, in Report on the Roles, Missions. and Functions of the Armed
Forces of the United States.)
In his preface to Both Swords and Plowshares, Miller explained how military
planners are currently faced with "a steady market in requirements keyed to regional
responses," and "a growing demand for peacekeeping and domestic support
capabilities." 12 At the same time however, the Admiral wrote that those planners must
also deal with a near-term reduction in size and a decrease in future investment, i.e.
fewer military resources. 13 Part of the proposed solution is to ensure that the nation's
"armed forces are able to operate smarter - more efficiently, more flexibly, and with a
better understanding of any potential adversary's strengths and vulnerabilities."1 4
Doing this, explained Miller, depends on realizing "the full force-multiplier potential of
jointness,"'15 and that the task is possible, in part, through the designation of a single
Unified CINC responsible for joint training, and the development of adaptive joint force
packaging.





Miller also proposed that the need to do things "smarter" is the combined result
of a number of factors: the rapid shrinkage of America's network of overseas military
bases, the reduction of U.S. military personnel permanently stationed overseas, the
general downsizing16 of the armed forces, and, of course, the prospect of an increasingly
unstable world demanding continued U.S. engagement. Complicating matters further
has been the emergence of a new array of non-traditional military missions, e.g.
peacekeeping and peacemaking, humanitarian tasks, combating the drug trade, and so.
forth.
Collectively, these developments stem largely from the end of the super-power
stand-off, and domestic budgetary pressures. Without the Soviet threat, and in
recognition of a national preoccupation with domestic "re-investment," the U.S. military
can and must reduce its force, and scale-back the permanent stationing of large
numbers of troops abroad. Unfortunately, the "new world order" has also brought to the
surface new kinds of conflicts - border disputes, ethnic war, mass refugee problems, and
so forth. As Admiral Miller puts it, "[llong simmering regional concernr, masked by
forty years of East-West competition, now compete for world attention."17 These new
conflicts, when combined with the demise of the specter of an East-West global war, has
forced (permitted?) the national military and political leadership to contemplate new,
non-traditional tasks, or what Mi Iler has called "future-oriented" missions. 18
Because of cuts in U.S. land-based overseas deployments, USACOM predicts
that theater combatant commanders will be more dependent on CONUS-based forces.
These forces, Miller insists, must be highly skilled, rapidly deployable, fully-capable of
operating as a joint team on arrival, and tailored to the needs of individual theater
16Miller apparently prefers the term "rightsizing."
17Miller, Both Swords and Plowshares, 1.
18 Ibid., 10.
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CINCs. The implication is that they must embody these qualities more so than in the
past - if not, why the need to do things differently? USACOM's commander implies that
the combination of an official joint force integrator and adaptive joint force packaging
will enhance the deployability, interoperability, and tailored efficiency - indeed the
overall effectiveness - of U.S. mili tarv forces.
In another indication of the need to do things differently, Miller has reported that
the "fairly rigid combination of permanently assigned forces and standardized
deployment groups," that have rnet CINC requirements for forward positioned forces
in the past, "may now provide mnore capability than is truly needed." 19 The implication
here is that scarce military resources may not be going to where they are most needed;
or in other words, that they may be unnecessarily strong in one place, and
overcommitted in another.
B. THE FOUR CORNERSTONES
No matter where we fight in the future, and no matter what the circumstances, we will
fight as a joint team. The Armed Forces of the United States will never again poke as individual
fingers; rather they will always strik-c as a closed fist.
(Admiral David E. Jeremiah, in "What's Ahead for the Armed Forces?"
In an article published in tht' inaugural issue of joint Force Quarterly, Miller cited
what he called the four fundamtntal "cornerstones" for realizing the full potential of
smaller, post-Cold War U.S. armed forces: joint training and exercises, joint doctrine, a
single commander responsible tor collective joint training needs, and adaptive joint
force packaging. 20 With respect to the first two, there appears to be little disagreement
with the idea that most, if not all future large-scale conflicts (and many smaller-scale
contingencies) will be fought jointly, i.e. with units drawn from at least two of the
19 Ibid., 27.
20paul David Miller, "A New Mission f, r Atlantic Command," loint Force Ouarterly Inaugural Issue
(Summer 1993): 80-87.
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Services. And although there are some who worry about the "limits of jointness," 21 few
argue against the likely benefits of expanded joint training and the development of a
more formalized and effective joint doctrine. Because jointness has become a relatively
non-controversial issue, these first two elements of USACOM's vision are not discussed
at length in this thesis, at least not as stand-alone issues. The other two elements
however, i.e. the concept of a single, official "joint force integrator," and especially
AJFP, have prompted considerable controversy and therefore deserve more thorough
description and analysis.
C. AJFP AND THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT
The goal of Adaptive Joint For e Planning is to to carry this joint planning concept down
the spectrum to demonstrate how alert response and presence missions can be filled with joint
forces.
(USACOM Brief AlFPs: 21st Century Force Employment.) 22
In its briefings, USACOM has repeatedly stressed that AJFPs and the AJFP planning
process are not intended to directly address so-called Major Regional Contingencies
(MRCs) or what are called "JSCP surge" sized conflicts, but are designed instead to
respond to the lower end of the military force-use spectrum.23 Evidently, it is here that
21For discussions of such "limits," see Seth Cropsey, "The Limits of Jointness," loint Force Ouarterly
Inagural Issue (Summer 1993): 72-79.
22U.S. Atlantic Command, Adaptive loi nt Force Packages. (briefing slides),(Norfolk: date unknown)
231n Les Aspin, The Bottom-Up Review Forces For A New Era (Washington, D.C.: GPO, September
1993), 5., examples of "MRCs" included aggression by a remilitarized Iraq against Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia, and by North Korea against the Republic of Korea. JSCP refers to the loint Strategc Capabilities
Elan, a classified document which, in ge'neral terms, outlines in considerable detail which forces are
allocated to which commanders, and specifies the range of operations that each CINC must prepare for.
The "JSCP-surge" term alludes to the fact that much of the JSCP document is focused on very large-scale
deployments and operations.
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USACOM believes its adaptive force packaging initiatives can generate the most
benefit. 24
Planning for joint operations. especially to cope with relatively large threats, is not a
novel concept; CINC staffs have long provided plans for joint operations in the form of
extremely detailed operations plans (OPLANS) for global conflict with the former-
Soviet Union and for MRCs, as well as somewhat less detailed contingency plans
(CONPLANS) for Lesser Regional Contingencies (LRCs). While some amount of
planning for what are called Flex ible Deterrent Options (FDOs)2s - designed for yet less
demanding situations - has occured, the bulk of joint planning appears to have focused
on just the largest-scale contingencies. As such, much less attention seems to have been
devoted to smaller operations.26 With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, a shift in
focus from global to regional warfare, and especially an intensified interest in non-
traditional missions, there appears to be a hightened (indeed urgent) need for
formalized, yet adaptive planning processes for smaller-scale joint operations against
undetermined threats. 27 Also needed are Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders and staffs,
joint force packages, and joint training and exercising that are specifically designed for
this lower end of the spectrum. AJFP is USACOM's answer to these needs.
24This appears to be the case, given the .cope of the initial AJFP menu discussed in a subsequent section.
25The joint Strategic Capabilites Plan for CY 1993-1995. Annex 0 (Forward Presence Operations),
UNCLASSIFIED, (Washington, D.C.: Dppartment of Defense, 1992), 1-7., describes Flexible Deterrent
Options as "actions to preempt or precipitate actions or reactions that may result in the protection of US
interests or the promotion of US influence." They are designed "to deter or forestall the onset of a crisis,"
and encompass "all of the elements of national power - economic, diplomatic, political, and military."
26This impression was reinforced by fa e-to-face interviews with CENTCOM planners, who seemed to
devote themselves almost exclusively to their two, very large-scale OPLANS.
27Colin L. Powell, National Military Strate"y of the United States, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992), 12.
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D. THE AJFP -MENU-
Warning time, or available wsponse time, is far more likely to be exploited by key
decisionmakers if they have a menu of options from which to choose. These options need to be pre-
planned and gauged to a wide range of crises. This fundamental change to our military strategy
is reflected in an adaptive planning process, through which planners develop multiple options
keyed to specific crises.
(Colin L. Powell, in the National Military Strategy of the United States.)28
The I-Plan that governed tho Atlantic Command's recent transformation indicates
that an initial "menu" of AJFPs would be identified by USACOM itself, but that
development of that menu would take account of "supported combatant commanders'
estimated requirements for employment of military forces for operations less than
MRC."29 Thus, the AJFP menu is to be constructed on the basis of both supporting md
supported CINC input, meaiing that both available resources =d regional
employment requirements are to be considered. One indication of the preliminary and
evolutionary nature of AJFP and its associated concepts is that no definitive AJFP menu
was included in the I-Plan.
At the time of this writing, an initial AJFP menu is just being formalized. That menu
will apparently include the following 13 notional packages: Nations Assistance,
Peacekeeping, Peace Building, Peace Making, Peace Enforcement, Non-Combatant
Evacuation Operations (NEO), No Fly Zone Enforcement, Military Assistance for
Civilian Disasters (MACDIS), Military Support to Civilian Authorities (MSCA)/Disaster
Relief, Quarantine/Blockade, Mass Migration, and Forward Presence.3 0 Considering
that nine of the 13 package options relate to what might be considered non-traditional
28Ibid.
2 9U.S. Atlantic Command, USACOM (I)raft) Implernentation Plan. (Norfolk: date unknown), 259.
3()his listing was provided in a telephne interviewv of USACOM staff officers.
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military missions,31 it is appropriate to turn to that aspect of USACOM's vision of the
future.
E. BOTH SWORDS AND PLOWSHARES
In the ongoing national debate, the armed forces - and, indeed, the budget of the Department
of Defense - must be clearly seen as valuable and integral components of our national strategy of
promoting peace and supporting emergent democracies. In a similar manner, the military can be
an integral component in rebuilding and revitalizing America's economic base and national
infrastructure. The military is more than a force for deterrence; it can and should be a force for
constructive change - at home and ab'road.
(Admiral Paul David Miller in Both Swords and Plowshares.)
It is clear from the above-quoted passage, indeed the very title of Admiral Miller's
recent monograph, that this Unified CINC favors using U.S. military forces for the range
of new, non-traditional tasks that includes peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance,
disaster relief, drug interdiction, etc. Although Miller's preliminary discussions of AJFP
did not specifically indicate that the concept was a result of, or a reaction to, the
increased probability of U.S. military forces being so applied, the initial AJFP menu
noted above seems to definitely link the two. The Admiral's view can perhaps be
represented best by the following passage in Both Swords and Plowshares: "By being
both a sword and a plowshare, the military can best help secure peace and prosperity in
an era of uncertainty, challenge and change."32 However, it is noted in the next chapter
that not everyone agrees with Admiral Miller regarding the necessity or prudence of
using U.S. armed forces for non-traditional missions.
3 1 Although many statements indicate that disaster relief is a task that has been accomplished relatively
often by American military forces since the Nation's inception, an equally wide range of statements
include this task under the common, "no •n-traditional" mission heading. Arbitrary or not, disaster relief
has also been included in this thesis within the non-traditional title, as it appears clearly outside of the
military's "traditional" combat role.
32Miller, Both Swords and Plowshare, .,7.
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F. AN EMPHASIS ON CAPABILITIES, AND JMETLS
The idea is that the customer - the CINC - tells USACOM what, not who. That is, the
customer says what he wants to do, not who he wants to do it.
(The Honorable Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense) 33
Both Swords and Plowshares stresses the need for so-called "capabilities-based"
defense planning.34 While a need to shift defense planning away from specific,
individual "threats" and toward broad-based, enduring capabilities has been perceived
for some time, Admiral Miller appears to take the idea one step further however. In
particular, he advocates a process whereby the theater warfighting CINCs would
articulate their requirements (for both forward presence and crisis response) in terms of
"capabilities," as opposed to a fixed list of requested forces. For example, a supported
CINC would no longer request an aircraft carrier, but instead the capability to achieve
air superiority. As another example, a CINC might call for the capability to evacuate a
U.S. Embassy, in lieu of a flight of six H-53s and a special forces company. Or, if E CINC
has the need for a show of U.S. resolve in a particular crisis, he should state his need in
those terms, rather than ask the traditional questions, "where is the carrier" or "how
soon can I have the 82nd Airborne." Under Miller's plan, the requesting (supported)
CINCs would state the requirement to do a particular mission, or set of missions, and
the providing (supporting) CINC would recommend either a "pre-planned" package
from a menu of set options, or a "crisis-planned" package. The choice between the two
would depend on the rwnge of available assets at the time, the specifics of the situation,
and the priority given to the supported CINC's mission.
33Les Aspin, Remarks at the USACOM Designation Ceremony in Norfolk, Virginia on 1 October 1993.
34Miller, Both Swords and Plowshares, 18.
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This concept of the "user" CINCs requesting capabilities instead of specific forces is
intended to be facilitated, in part, by the use of the Joint Mission Essential Tasks List
(JMETL), or something like it.35 JMETL is the evolution of an Army concept, which uses
formalized lists of "essential tasks" to plan for, execute, and evaluate training exercises.
These lists exist for all types and sizes of Army units, and use standardized, common
terms, so that all units of similar size or mission have a common basis for their training
exercises. This Army idea has now been extended to the joint arena, and the Joint Staff
U-7) has recently finished compiling a Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) which contains
all the joint training tasks that were articulated by two or more Unified CINCs in their
individual, theater-specific task lists.
While the UJTL and the individual JMETLs were developed for training purposes,
some people have suggested them as useful tools requesting and supplying forces for
forward presence and crisis response operations as well. As a practical matter however,
the specific details of how the UJTL and JMETLs might be used for Q.tationa1
purposes remain very tentative. The terms used in the UJTL provide little specificity as
to task conditions and standards, and are notably oriented toward the functional
training requirements of joint task force commanders and staffs. As such, they are not,
at this point at least, particularly usefud for deciding what type and size of force are
needed to conduct a particular, individual operation.
G. "TOOL KITS" AND "RUBIC'S CUBES"
For my purposes, the six sides of the cube represent the range of capabilities that exist in the
Air Force ... Army... Marine Covs. ... Navy... non-military agencies... and international
agencies... Thus, a Rubic's Cube i.• transformed into what I term a "capability cube."
(Admiral Paul David Miller)
35 Such utilization of JMETs was articulated in Miller, A New Mission for Atlantic Command. 84, and in
the discussion provided in U.S. Atlantic Command, Major Points and Analysis: First Adaptive Joint Force
Forward Presence Conference.
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Despite the downsizing of U.S. forces, considerable numbers will remain. 36
According to proponents, AJFP will simply make better use of those remaining assets,
especially with regard to forward presence and smaller, crisis response operations. With
respect to the first, a theater CINC may no longer be able to count on the traditional
combination of a Navy carrier hattlegroup (CVBG) and a Marine amphibious ready
group (MARG) to provide continuous, on-scene capability for air superiority, long-
range strike, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), non-combatant evacuation operations (NE,
maritime interdiction, amphibioi is or air-assault, etc. The reduction of U.S. naval forces
signifies that an aircraft carrier and/or a large-deck amphibious assault ship, and/or a
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) may no longer always be available for regular
peacetime deployments, or even for short-notice responses to particular crises. As a
result, supported CINCs will be forced, at times, to either do without the "old" CVBG-
MARG capability, or rely on the wherewithall of other, alternative combinations of
assets.
USACOM, in its many briefings on AJFP, has provided a number of novel
descriptions for how different mixes of forces might provide the broad-based, multi-
mission, forward presence capabilities (including air, ground and maritime capabilities)
traditionally provided by rotationally deployed CVBGs and MARGs. Most imply that
an Air Force composite air wing could be used as a substitute for the carrier's airwing,
or that the MARG's ground force missions might be fulfilled by Army forces, and many
depict the totality of available L .S. forces as a typical tool-kit or tool-box, from which
smaller tool-packages would be drawn. As well, a range of similar but updated versions
of the original graphics depict the mixing and matching of forces in terms of Admiral
Miller's novel Rubic's Cube analogy.
36Aspin, Bottom-Up Review 17., indicates that by 19•99, the U.S. force structure will contain 15 active and
reserve Army divisions, 11 deployable Navy aircraft carriers, three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs),
and 20 active and reserve Air Force fighter airwing!, plus 184 bombers.
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Besides offering a solution for the CINCs' needs for peacetime forward presence,
the AJFP concept is also envisioned as a better way to provide the exact mix of
capabilities needed for smaller-scale, mission-specific, and in some cases, limited-
duration contingencies. Many of these might be considered non-traditional military
tasks. The details of what particular forces might make up these other, mission-specific
packages, have yet to be articulated.
As indicated earlier, USACOM will soon have at its immediate disposal the full
range of forces included in LANTFLT, ACC, FORSCOM, and MARFORLANT. It will
also be able to draw on the forces and functional capabilities of STRATCOM, SOCOM,
and other non-regional unified commands. Theses forces will constitute USACOM's full
military "tool-kit" or Rubic's Cube. It will then be up to USACOM, through its power to
organize, train and deploy AJFPs, to develop combinations of forces (i.e. packages) that
are suitable for the theater CINC's future foward presence and crisis response needs - as
indicated, a series of smaller, mission-specific "tool-packages" or iterations of
"spinning" the Cube.
It is important to note that Miller also sees non-military and non-U.S. initiatives,
assets, and capabilities as able to contribute to the new security environment; they, too,
can conceivably be "packaged" along with U.S. military units to achieve national (and
international) security and foreign policy objectives. As such, Miller envisions closer
coordination between America's military, civilian, political and diplomatic assets, and
proposes that significant, synergistic effects will accrue from combining the potential of
those assets into deliberate foreign policy initiatives and responses.
H. PACKAGE DEVELOPMENT
... coordinate with USACOM component commands and the other Unified Commands as
appropriate for the designation of the most effective type militar, unit regardless of service
affiliation or assignment to Unified Command.
(USACOM Implementation Plan.)
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According to the USACOM I-Plan, AJFPs will include two basic types:
"Preplanned" and "Crisis Response." 3 7 The first includes USACOM's standard "off-the-
shelf" packages, to be employed when the crisis at hand corresponds reasonably to the
mission, employment concept, and functional capabilities of one of those shelf
packages. Crisis Response AJFPs, in contrast, are to be exercised for unforseen threats
and unexpected contingencies, or when a preplanned AJFP does not meet the supported
combatant commander's requirements. Furthermore, it is envisioned that a preplanned
package may serve, at times, as the "core" around which a crisis response package can
be developed. This option appears to be, at least in part, the origin of the word
"adaptive" in adaptive joint forct, packaging.
Whether the package is preplanned or built ad hoc in response to particular crisis,
each package is to have the following characteristics: a specific mission statement, a
concept of employment, a listing of functional capabilities, a designated joint force
commander and staff, a listing of type-unit composition, detailed lift and sustainment
requirements, and a graduated deployment time-line. M
USACOM briefings also indicate that the initial task of developing adaptive force
packages will fall on USACOM'ý various service components, i.e. the Air Force's ACC,
the Army's FORSCOM, the Marline Corps' MARFORLANT, and the Navy's LANTFLT.
Each component will be assigned those packages that most closely correspond to their
Title 10-designated roles and missions.34 While each package will therefore have a
single-service "sponsor," that sponsor will, technically, be able to draw on any and all of
the forces of the other services. In theory, the package developers will use those forces
that are most suited for the missi n, regardless of their origin.




L "VALUE ADDED" PACKAGE TRAINING
Orienting deploying joint force training toward supported CINC requirements and training
those forces alongside designated backup units will help ensure additional forces can be deployed
whenever required. Surge forces will arrive in theater organized, trained, and ready for large
scale joint operations.
(Admiral Paul David Miller, speaking before the Senate Armed Services
Committeee.)
USACOM is adamant that the proposed AJFP packages will not become mere
"tpaper tigers," and put on the shelf to gather dust. In order to ensure against this, most,
if not all, of the packages on the menu are to be trained and exercised on a regular basis
so that they may be ready when and if they are needed. This is the "value added"
dimension of the AJFP concept, and if carried out, appears to break with the past
practice of dealing with most smaller military contingencies on an adhoc and off-the-
cuff basis. In the past, even when there had been substantial prior planning for smaller
contingencies, the commanders and staffs directed to carry-out the plans rarely appear
to have had any detailed previous experience (or training) with the plans, or the forces
assigned to carry them out. This seems to have been especially true when the forces
were drawn from multiple services. USACOM's proposals promise to change this.
It is important to note that the kind of package training envisioned does not
necessarily mean that all the actual forces in the package will be trained together.
Package training focuses on training and exercising the joint task force commanders,
and core staffs (that will lead and manage the packages), and not necessarily on the
individual sailors, soldiers and airman that will be used. USACOM's philosophy is
evidently that "a trigger-puller i., a trigger-puller, and a truck-driver is a truck-driver,"
regardless of whether they are ouIling triggers and driving trucks in a Somalia-type
humanitarian assistance operation, or a Desert Storm-like combat campaign. In any
case, training to pull triggers or drive trucks is a Title 10 service responsibility, and is
not intended to be the purview of AJFP's joint training focus.
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Having said this, USACOM nevertheless envisions its joint force integration and
training function as an opportunity to create beneficial joint training effects over and
above the "value added" specifically associated with AJFP training. While USACOM
cannot officially direct the individual training provided by the Army, Navy, Air Force
and Marines,40 its planners believe they can indirectly generate additional joint training
opportunities by merely "encouraging" service-specific training to coincide sufficiently.
Consider, for example, that in the past, the Army might have been conducting an
integrated infantry and armor evolution in one of its many CONUS training ranges, and
simultaneously, the Navy and Marine Corps may have been doing an amphibious
assault and aerial bombing exercise in say Puerto Rico. In yet a third training scenario,
the Air Force may have been rumning a long-range strike exercise for its F-15s, F-111s,
and F-117s. However, it is likely that those training exercises were in no way
coordinated, or built into a centralized, joint training opportunity for available joint
commanders and staffs. With that in mind, USACOM believes that it can serve as a
facilitator, able to pull the Services' training evolutions into an ongoing, coordinated
program designed to create joint training opportunities that are more robust and less
predictable than heavily-scripted, computer-based simulations.41
J. PACKAGE DEPLOYMENT
As the Adaptive Joint Force concept matures, supported CINCs will be able to "write a more
accurate prescription" - based on the evolving situation in their respective AORs - calling
forward only the precise capabilities needed.
(Admiral Paul David Miller, in Both Swords and Plowshares.)
40According to Powell, Roles and Missions Report, 111-3, this issue of infringement upon Title 10, service-
specific training authority was, in part, behind the failure of the previous STRICOM and REDCOM
initiatives.
41See Robert Holzer, "USACOM Seeks 'mailer, More Frequent Joint Exercises," D 15-21
November 1993,20. This envisioned cot rdination of service training exercises was also articulated in
telephone conversations with USACOM planners, and in Paul David Miller, Statement before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, Washingtoii, D.C. on 20 April 1993.
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USACOM's new role as a designated, official joint force integrator and provider has
been referred to as "the one-stop-shop approach." That characterization appears to be
overblown and, indeed, downright inaccurate. USACOM's initial vision of how the
process of package selection and deployment might work is described next.
A supported CINC, in need of military forces, will transmit a list of required
capabilities to CJCS and USACOM simultaneously. USACOM then either proposes to
respond with an existing AJFP from its "off-the-shelf" menu, or initiates the
development of a crisis response package. If needed, the supported CINC and
USACOM will negotiate specifit adjustments to the proposed package. Once both are
satisfied that the package meets the supported CINC's requirements, and is feasible
from a resource standpoint, USACOM will issue an initiating directive and submit the
AJFP proposal to the CJCS for approval. If the CJCS approves, he will direct the
deployment of the AJFP. If necessary, other supporting CINCs may also be directed to
provide forces. Finally, USACOM will "make it all happen.' 42
Aside from the requesting, negotiating, approving, and directing activities noted
above, there are also all the activities that are required for, as indicated, making it
happen. To do this, each force package on the AJFP menu will be integrated into a
"Automatic Force Generator Concept,"43 which is intended to greatly facilitate the
deployment process. While it is indicated that this force generator process will attempt
to leverage existing, automated logistics and deployment programs (designed and
already in-place for large-scale deployments), the real innovation lies in applying these
existing systems to the deployment of significantly smaller force packages, and for
operations at the lower-end of the spectrum; areas to which they have not necessarily
been applied in the past.
4 2This process was detailed graphically in U.S. Atlantic Command, USACOM Implementation Plan
Annex C: Adaptive loint Force Package, (briefing slides).
43Ibid.
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K. FULL JOINT FORCE PACKAGES AND TAILORED FORWARD ELEMENTS
The supported CINCs will be conhdent tHie tailored joint force elements in their theater are
backed up by a trained and ready joi;it force package.
(Admiral Paul David Miller, in Both Swords and Plowshares.)44
Admiral Miller's published statements and USACOM's briefings both emphasize
the concept of full joint force packages being developed, trained, and maintained in
CONUS to support the possible range of likely requirements of each Unified
Commander, and tailold elements of the full package being positioned forward to
meet those CINCs' requirement tor actual, day-to-day forward presence. The benefit of
this is characterized as an increased level of confidence that the tailored elements placed
forward can be suplemented quickly by deploying the rest of the full force package
when needed, and that the forward and surge elements can operate effectively once
joined together in-theater. Thi, is considered possible by virtue of the full force
package's prior, integrated training.
The need for this was articLtlated in a point paper written by a former Atlantic
Command staff officer regarding the applicability of AJFPs. That paper indicated that
Navy carrier air wings recently deployed in the Persian Gulf were tasked with
operating jointly with an in-plac, USAF Composite Air Wing in coordinated air strikes.
Unfortunately, as the author nited, neither the Navy, nor the Air Force units had
significant experience in planning or executing coordinated air sirikes with their sister
service, and as a result, considerable difficulties were experienced. The author of the
paper offered the opinion that, considering the difficulties experienced, "forming an
AJFP, training in CONUS and then deploying presents obvious advantages." 45
"4Miller, Both Swords and Plowshares, 29.
4 5R. Lynch, Application of Adaptive joint Force raaa , (Norfolk: date unknown)., a point-paper
recommended for inclusion into the US .\COM I-Plan.
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L THE THEOQD RE THEODORE ROOSEVELI/SPMAGTF INITIATIVE
Thus, may it please your Excellencies, I have detailed some, though by no means all, the
considerations which led me to form the project of a lunar voyage. I shall now proceed to lay
before you the result of an attempt ,Io apparently audacious in conception, and, at all events, so
utterly uparalleled in the annals of mankind.
(Hans Pfaall, in The Unparalleled Adventure of One Hans Pfaall.)
It seems worthwhile to explain, at this point, the first notable, real-world AJFP
experiment. The case in point is the deployment, from April to September of 1993, of the
battlegroup centered around the Navy aircr-ilt carrier Theodore Roosevelt. While the
force consisted of 11 ships (a fairly standard, Cold War-era complement), the carrier's
embarked airwing was adjusted .and downsized to make room for a 600-man, 10-aircraft
Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF). 46 The stated objectives of
the experiment were to test the SPMAGTF concept, in particular, "one of sufficient size
and capability to ensure mission effectiveness, yet small enough to embark on a
CV/CVN," and to "combine CV/CVN speed and firepower with SPMAGTF
capabilities to respond to crisis, disaster, instability or non-traditional security
missions." 47 A number of other more specific objectives were tested as well, notably
some cost savings, and a flexibility associated with being able to operate the
simultaneously deployed .aipa MARG separately while retaining some organic
"green" capability on-board the (-V.
Making room for the SPMAGTF aboard the Theodore Roosevelt necessitated a
reduction of the carrier's traditioial sstandard mix of aircraft. In particular, F-14 fighters
and S-3 ASW aircraft were removed in order to create deck and berthing space for the
Marines, their helicopters, and equipmenL The rationale behind these specific choices
46Author Unknown, "USN Carrier Becime.- Multi-Force Assault Platform," lane's Defense Weekly 20
February 1993, 19.
47 U.S. Atlantic Command, Adaptive loint Force Packages: 21st Century Force Employment (briefing
slides),(Norfolk: date unknown).
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was the expectation that the scheduled operating environment would require less air
superiority anid ASW capability'. Incidentally, the SPMAGTF's command, infantry,
support, and aviation elements wvere taken directly out of the 26th MEU organization,
deployed simultaneously in the Mediterranean aboard the SaiR ncentered MARG. As a
result, the MEU had somewhat less than its full, standard complement and
traditionally-advertised capability, a fact that was presented, in advance, to the
supported theater CJNC.
As will be discussed more fully in a later section of the thesis, the packaging
initiative associated with the Theodore Roosevelt CVBG and the Sala MARG has
drawn to AJEP what appears to be an unwarranted amount of criticism and skepticism.
In other words, and as USACOM planners repeatedly emphasize, the CV/SPMAGTF
combination is only one small aspect of the much larger AJFP, and should not be the
basis of any final conclusions about that parent concept's overall validity. Having
mentioned criticism and skepticism, it is now appropriate to turn to that aspect of the
thesis, as publicly outlining the articulated concerns with AJFP is one of the primary
purposes of this project.
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III. THE CASE AGAINST AJFP AND USACOM'S NEW ROLE
To some extent, each of these obiections has seeds of a service-parochial reaction to the AJFP
concept. However, the fact that confe'rence participants succeeded in misunderstanding the AJFP
concept even after repeated explanations suggests that misunderstanding was engendered to
some degree by the logic of the concept itself.
(Analytical Commentary from Major Points and Analysis: First Adaptive Toint
Force Forward Presence Conference.)
Considerable skepticism has been voiced about many aspects of the AJFP initiative,
as well as about some specific elements of USACOM's other new functions.
Unfortunately, the reasoning for those reservations varies widely, and has not always
been articulated in identical terms. This makes a methodical, detailed presentation of
the case against AJFP more difficult. Nevertheless, some common themes emerge. This
chapter attempts to present those themes clearly and accurately within the source-
constraints cited earlier. It is important to emphasize that the criticisms cited are not
necessarily the author's views. They are presented in no particular order, although
some have greater pertinence for AJFP (narrowly defined) than others.
It is important also to point out that the vast majority of the most "audible"
negative opinions encountered to date about AJFP centered on the Theodore
Roosevelt/SPMAGTF deployment. In other words, a very small aspect of the AJFP
concept, i.e. putting Marines aboard a carrier and adjusting the traditional make-up of a
MARG, has become a lightning rod of sorts for AJFP critics generally. Given that the
Theodore Roosevelt experience is the only one in which the AJFP concept went from a
theoretical concept to an operational reality, this disproportionate attention may be
understandable. It may also be unfair, in the sense that it could provide a premature,
"unbalanced," and unwarranted thumbs down to AJFP as a whole; somewhat like
throwing out the baby with the bathwater.
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A. UNIT INTEGRITY
... while services do routinezy break up units, there is a point or level at which unit
integrity is essential. For example, if a MEU is broken up for diverse missions for more than a
finite period, it would cease to rnauiitain it's advertised mission capability as a MEU, and we
cannot do that institutionally.
(Chief of the Joint Operations Directorate) 48
The so-called "unit integrity" issue refers to the belief that AJFP will break-uv the
Services' traditional combat organizations to the detriment of their overall readint.-, and
effectiveness. This has been a criticism, in particular, of the Marine Corps. This service is
organized for warfighting and deployment purposes into Marine Air-Ground Task
Forces (MAGTFs), of which the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is the smallest
commonly trained and employed. The Marines acknowledge that even smaller MAGTF
units are available, and have been used for a number of more limited, special purpose
missions, but the MEU remains the basic building-block. It is this block that is routinely
trained and "worked-up" prior to deployment, and then rotated forward as part of a
MARG. The MEU is also the Marine's smallest MAGTF that can be considered to have
the full range of command, .:ombined arms, and support elements, including
communications, infantry, artillery, armor, engineer, reconnaissance, aviation, and
logistics components. 49
As indicated earlier, AJFP's first real-world experiment with the Theodore
Roosevelt deployment has become central to many critics' arguments. In the case of the
Marine Corps, it is cited as evidence of AJFP's ill-effects on unit integrity. Clearly, the
experiment parted with the Corps' tradition. As noted, the carrier deployed with a
r:elatively small (though large for a CV) Marine contingent embarked. Because the
48As quoted in U.S. Atlantic Command Maior Points and Analysis: First Adaptive loint Force Forward
Presence Conference.
49U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Air-Grouvd Task Force: A Global Capability, FMFRP 2-12, Washington D.C.
10 April 1991.
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SPMAGTF's infantry, aviation, st ipport, and command elements were taken directly out
of the accompanying MARG's bttalion-sized MEU, the MEU itself could no longer be
considered quite up to its full, traditionally-advertised strength. Nor did the MEU have
all the internal elements which its doctrine and SOPs had in mind when drafted. As a
result, considerable concern was created within the Marine Corps about the long-term
impact on the basic MEU building-block organization, including doctrine and assumed
capabilities, should the CV/SPM AGTF, and reduced-MEU, become models for regular,
repetetive future deployments.
Within the Navy, observations about AJFP's effect on basic building-blocks has
been mixed. On the one hand, objections appear to have been minimal with regard to
modifying the composition of this service's traditional building block, the full CVBG.
Most Navy planners recognize and acknowledge the almost total demise of the Soviet
threat, and therefore generally accept the notion that the standard CVBG complement
may provide a range of capabilities that is no longer needed. In particular, the shift in
emphasis from preparing for large-scale war at sea against the Soviets, in favor of
preparations for smaller-scale littoral warfare against less capable foes, means that the
standard 10 to 11-ship carrier battlegroup combination may have become an exception
rather than the rule. Specifically, wide-spread concensus points to the CV no longer
needing the overwhelmingly capable ASW and anti-air warfare (AAW) screens whose
primary mission it was to protect and defend the carrier against waves of Soviet
bombers and attack submarines Some planners even indicate that the aircraft carrier
itself may not always be required. On the balance, the Navy seems to be relatively
comfortable with the idea of forming, training, and deploying alternative, including
non-carrier, combinations of ships. In fact, the Navy has actually been doing so for a
number of years. This acceptance is reinforced, it seems, by the fact that most Navy
ships are themselves "balanced' capabilities packages, complete with offensive and
defensive weaponry, communications, and other support capabilities.
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The issue of unit integrity has however generated considerable concern with respect
to adjusting or modifying the integral components of individual ships, or of units
aboard those ships. Especially at issue is the organization and make-up of the aircraft
carrier's embarked airwing. The Theodore Roosevelt experiment has, again, provided
ammunition for skeptics.
It has already been noted that to make room for the SPMAGTF and the its Air
Combat Element (ACE) aboard the Theodore Roosevelt a number of F-14 Tomcat
fighter/interceptors were removed, as well all S-3 Viking anti-submarine aircraft. As
said, the particular changes were motivated by the belief that these aircraft would be
"redundant" in the ship's area or operations. With respect to the F-14s, it appears that
this expectation fell short of reality. It turned out that a primary mission for the
Theodore Roosevelt during its stay in the Mediterranean was the enforcement of a UN-
mandated no-fly zone over Bosnia. This was a task that demanded long-range air
superiority aircraft like the missing Tomcats. The S-3s were also sorely missed, not
because of an unforseen submarine threat, but because their secondary roles - aerial
tanking and carrier on-board delivery (COD) - were not adequately filled by other
designated assets.5°
Modern U.S. aircraft carrier. are finely-tuned, highly-complex systems with many
diverse, well-coordinated components. They are designed from the keel up for a
particular (blue-water) operating environment, with a specific range of missions in
mind, and so as to accomodate certain sizes and types of weapons. Although the carrier
(along with its large-deck amphibious assault ship counterpart) has proven to be quite
adaptable to new mixes of weapon systems, and have demonstrated great flexibility
with respect to operating environments and assigned missions, their adaptability and
flexibility are not unlimited. Some Navy and Marine Corps officers are concerned that
r0Problems associated with the removal of F-14s and S-3s from the Theodore Roosevelt airwing were
articulated during telephone interviewý with Navy Staff planners and Carrier Airwing (CVW) operators.
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the Theodore Roosevelt/SPMA TF/Saipan experiment either pushed the outer edge
of, or exceed those limits.
The Army and Air Force appear, for the most part, much less concerned over AJFP's
impact on unit integrity. Both services seem comfortable with the idea of contributing
forces to the pool from which adaptive force package elements would be drawn, and
with the prospect that their traditional building-blocks may be modified to accomodate
the requirements of a particular situation. With respect to the Army, FORSCOM staff
officers indicated that their service regularly trains its smaller elements to operate
independently, or as part of adho combined-arms mixes with other types of forces.
Those same officers did point out thought that the situation differs somewhat for
combat arms and support units. In the case of the former, the battalion is a basic
building-block, and the lowest level at which full command and control, intelligence
and staff functions are integrated. By contrast, the support units were characterized as
even more flexible, and could be adjusted without undue difficulty down to the
smallest units.
The Air Force appears to view the issue of unit integrity similarly, or in other
words, with little trepidation that USACOM's force packaging initiatives will routinely,
and significantly, disrupt the operating patterns and doctrine associated with its basic
force building-blocks. With respect to building-blocks, while staff officers at ACC
indicated that the squadron is the fundamental unit that should not be broken-up, they
envisioned that future Air Force operations within the AJFP system would come
primarily in the form of deploying their new, and now more formalized "composite air
wings."
The gracious attitude of the Army and Air Force must, however, be taken with a
grain of salt. In explination, and based on the vast majority of interviews conducted by
this researcher, it appears that the most likely application for Army and Air Force units
under the AJFP concept is limited-scale, mission-specific contingencies. This stems in
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part, of course, from their inevitable dependence on land-basing. As a result, it has been
argued that it is much less likely that the Army and Air Force will participate heavily in,
or supplant the Navy and Marine Corps' dominant role in, packages designed for long-
term, rotationally-maintained, continuous peacetime forward presence outside of
Central Europe and North East Asia. As such, the effect (even worse-case) that AJFP
might have on the Army and Air Force overall, appears to be somewhat less than that
indicated for the Navy and Marine Corps. For example, if new and innovative
packaging concepts are routinely used for peacetime forward presence operations,
virtually all of the Navy and Marine Corps' basic building-blocks may pass through the
new system within a few years' ti me.
On the other hand, many predict only occasional and limited-scope Army and Air
Force participation in AJFP; i.e. for specific, mission-specific crises rather than the year-
round presence associated with naval forces. While that participation may well be
extremely important and decisive, the above note prediction alludes to the fact that
there might be little chance that anything more than a very small portion of the Army
and Air Force's entire force will be exposed to the adjustment (some would say
disruption) that adaptive force packaging promises to impose. This is not to imply that
the Army and Air Force's contribution to AJFP is any less important, or that their
"support" of it is any less sincere', it only highlights the inevitable difference in impact
that AJFP may have on the individual services. If nothing else, it is a probable cause for
the disparity in relative levels of concern voiced by the different military organizations.
The Army did express one. very specific concern, however. In particular, one
FORSCOM officer indicated that the practice of deploying Army OH-58 helicopters
aboard smaller Navy combatants has created difficulties within that specific helicopter
community, i.e. difficulties associated with half the squadron being deployed while the
other haft remained stateside, uiable to be integrated into typical training evolutions
that require a full squadron. While this concern appears to be at the margins of overall
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skepticism with AJFP, it nevertheless suggests the possibility of problems with using
mission-specific assets from ont, service to fill short-falls of a particular capability in
another service. One example of such use that may become more frequent in the future
is the use of Navy or Marine Corps "Harm-shooters" by the Air Force for the
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) role. This is a mission that the Air Force is
finding increasingly difficult to carry-out as its F-4G "Wild Weasel" aircraft are
retired. 51 The perceived problem is that such lending and borrowing could lead to an
unacceptable disruption of the aircraft squadrons' normal operating patterns, especially
as Navy aircraft (and now Marine aircraft) are increasingly operating, by virtue of their
extended deployments aboard carriers, at the outer edge of their personnel tempo of
operations (PERSTEMPO) limitations. 52
In sum, it appears that AJFP envisions employing the individual Services' forces in
some new and innovative ways. This has prompted concern that traditional force
building-blocks will be modified and/or revised. Moreover, perceptions are also that
the Navy and the Marine Corps may face greater adjustments in this regard than the
Army and Air Force, by virtue of the former's envisioned higher rate of participation in
AJFP packaging initiatives actually employed. The concerns seem to turn on two
fundamental questions: will AJFP, in fact, disrupt the Services' basic building-blocks,
and if so, will the adjustments thus created bring more costs than benefits?
As for the first question, it seems unlikely that AJFP will disrupt the services'
traditional force units profoundly and on a regular. Aside from the unique carrier-
51The shortage of USAF "smart HARM-shiooters, and the likelihood that USN/USMC aircraft will be
called-on in the future to fill the shortage, is indicated in U.S. Atlantic Command, Adaptive loint Force
Packagg.Qpt= and James A. Winnefeld and Dana Johnson, "Unity of Control: Joint Air Operations in
the Gulf War," roint Force Ouarterly Inagural Issue (Summer 1993): 95.
52For the official Navy policy regarding PERSTEMPO, something for which the Army and Air Force have
no expressed equivalent, see: Department of the Navy, OrNAV INSTRUCTION 3000.13A, (Washington,
D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, December 1990). The primary intent of this policy is to
minimize the hardships on naval personnel by limiting out-of-area deployments to six months, and
requiring that a unit spend at least 50% of its time in homeport over a five year cycle.
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amphibious unit cross-decking experiment of the Theodore Roosevelt CV/SPMAGTF
deployment, the vast majority of USACOM and Admiral Miller's packaging concepts
clearly envision using the services' basic building-blocks basically unchanged and intact
to construct new, different, and unconventional cm iQns of those building-blocks.
As is outlined in the next chapter, the CV/SPMAGTF model appears to be destined for
the "good idea shelf," rejected as a viable option for regular, repetitive peacetime
deployments. Again, a deeply-felt disruption of the military's fundamental building-
blocks, caused solely by AJFP, appears unlikely.
With respect to the second question, it may be argued that some adjustment of the
military's basic-building blocks may well be warranted at this point. To begin with,
many of those building-blocks were developed during, and in response to, a security
environment that no longer exists. In other words, they were created primarily with
American-Soviet, high-intensity global war in mind, and not the lower-intensity,
regional, and non-traditional applications that are now seen as more likely. In addition,
some of those building-blocks appear to have been formulated on the basis of of the
pool of assets then available. Those assets are rapidly declining in number, so they may
therefore no longer provide a logical starting point from which to construct the Services'
basic force building-blocks.
While the recent 1991 Gulf War validated many traditional Cold War planning and
employment concepts, even that conflict is seen by many as less than representative of
the future employment of American forces; i.e. it is viewed as an anomoly rather than
the model. Consequently, even if AJFP does not portend the kind of major unit integrity
disruption that some suspect it will, one could question whether some significant
disruption and/or adjustment is not, in fact, in order. Clearly, considering the Air
Force's emerging Composite Air Wing concept, and the move within the Navy to shrink
standard Cold War-sized CVBGs, those organizations obviously feel that some
adjustment to their traditional ways of organizing things is due. Moreover, even the
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Marine Corps' basic deployable building-block, the MEU, is changing for reasons that
seem to have little to do with USACOM's adaptive force packaging per se.53
To finalize this discussion, it is worthwhile to cite the U.S. Naval Forces Europe
(NAVEUR) representative to the First Adaptive Joint Force Forward Presence
Conference, who indicated his belief that "a prerequisite to further development of the
AJFP concept is to determine what the lowest levels are for units to be mixed and
matched into AJFPs." In concluding his remarks, the NAVEUR representative also
posed the following questions: "How low-down can we go in terms of unit size for each
service and still have units that can effectively contribute to the AJFP?" And "What
tools work well with each other?"154 As such, it appears that this issue of unit integrity
will remain a source of debate among the services, in part, by virtue of some force
building-blocks being developed with rotational forward presence operating
requirements in mind, and others being based on a different (non-forward presence) set
of requirements and planning assumptions.
B. DIMINISHES THE ROLE OF THE CJCS AND JOINT STAFF
While this particular concern has now, apparently been resolved, it seems
worthwhile to touch on it at least briefly. In the minds of many (in particular, those on
the Joint Staff), the new USACOM mandate would include what some have called a
"one-stop-shop" approach to the force providing process; a process whereby supported
CINCs would come directly to USACOM to procure forces for peacetime presence or
short-notice response to a crisis. This would break with the apparent previous practice
of submitting requests directly to the CJCS and his Joint Staff, who would then
53Of course, the reference here is to the many MEU adjustments that have been necessitated by cutting-
back on the number of amphibious ships deployed in a MARG, from the fairly standard five to a now
more common three (a reflection of an overall smaller fleet).
54US. Atlantic Command, Maior Points and Analysis: First Adaptive loint Force Forward Presence
Confn 11.
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coordinate and relay the requests on to the Services and/or force-providing unified
CINCs. The argument was that the Chairman and the Joint Staff would now be "out of
the loop," and not in a position to exercise their coordination and oversight role. As
indicated, this concern now appears to have been resolved. The USACOM I-Plan
outlines, in concrete terms, the process by which forces would be requested from, and
provided by, USACOM; a process which clearly includes the CJCS and the Joint Staff.
With regard to this concern, it appears that USACOM planners originally intended
for the AJFP system to allow supported and supporting CINCs to deal directly with one
another and decide which packages were best suited the requirements of the user CINC,
and appropriate from a resource standpoint. The idea was that the CJCS, the Joint Staff,
and the National Command Authority (NCA) would come into play almost exclusively
at the tail-end of the process. Ot course, the uniformed military continues to lack the
legal authority to approve and 'sign" deployment orders and must go to its civilian
leadership (the NCA) for that function. As indicated by the package deployment system
outlined earlier, Joint Staff and CJCS involvement will occur thrughout the process,
and not solely at the tail-end. Recent conversations with USACOM planners indicate
however, that they remain convinced that the AJFP process would be more effective if
Joint Staff invovement were minimized, restricted to a simple relay of NCA approval or
disapproval of packaging decisions arrived at between the user and provider CINCs. 55
Apparently, USACOM's wishes in this matter have not be adopted.
55 USACOM planners articulated the following view: that the correct interpretation of the role of the CJCS
and his staff is merely as advisors to the National Command Authority, and as coordinators of the
Services - not of the Unified CINCs. As .uch, they appear to believe that the Chairman and Joint Staff's
heavy participation in the AJFP system is neither logical nor efficient. In particular, they perceive that it
undermines the power and effectiveness of the Unified CINCs to conduct joint military operations in
their theaters; in their mind, a primary intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
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C. ADDS ADDITIONAL BUREAUCRACY
Our goal is to keep the Atlanti, Command flexible and customer-oriented by avoiding the
bureaucracy often attendant to large staffs. The best way to do that is to use wisely the
tremendous capability which already exists at the component level.
(Admiral Paul David Miller before the Senate Armed Services Committee.)56
This bureaucracy concern is two-fold. First, there is general skepticism about
USACOM's ability to accomodate the inclusion of ACC and FORSCOM without
creating a significant amount of additional, inefficient bureaucracy. As indicated by the
above quoted passage, USACOM counters this charge by pointing to its intention to rely
on the management and planning capabilities of the Army and Air Force organizations
that will become service components. As a result, Atlantic Command planners do not
foresee any growth of their organization that is not commensurate with their expanded
role and additional responsibilities.
There is an additional concern however. Some express their belief that USACOM's
new joint force integrator and packaging roles will add a burdensome and unnecessary
layer of decision-making to the already difficult process of crisis response force
allocation. Whereas the theater warfighting CINCs previously had to go through only
the Joint Staff and the Services to get the forces they needed, AJFP critics argue that
those CINCs will now have to go through the Joint Staff, USACOM, and the Services.
This worry appears to be less than well-founded, however. It appears that under the
new plan for force provision, the individual services will be largely taken out of the
loop. In other words, they will be relegated to their intended (indeed mandated) role of
organizing, training and equipping forces, and will have less influence over what units
are sent where and when. The new system appears to signal a change most notably for
the Army and Air Force, by virtue of the fact that the vast bulk of their CONUS-based
56Miller, Statement before the Senate Armed Serices Committee. 16.
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operational forces having been newly placed under the direct control of a Unified
Commander; the Navy and Marine Corps' forces have had this experience for some
time.
Thus, with major CONUS-based operational elements of all four services now being
place under USACOM, the procss of selecting units for mission-specific tasks, training
them to operate as a joint team, and deploying them rapidly and efficiently, appears to
be more streamlined, rather than more laborious, difficult, and bureaucratic.
D. THE LIMITS OF CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING
With respect to capabilities reqtired, EUCOM most often cited requirements in terms of a
shorthand, using names of potential crisis countries or regions, or ongoing JTF operations that
could open up and require more or different forces.
(Major Points and Analysi" First Adaptive loint Force Forward Presence
Conference.)
Discussions with theater U nified CINC planners (EUCOM and CENTCOM in
particular) indicated some concern that capabilities-based plani-ing - vice planning with
specific threats and force-assets in mind - will be most difficult. It was explained to this
researcher that theater warplans are essentially a detailed accounting of the operational
and logistical strategies and tactics that will be used for particular warfighting senarios,
and that these scenarios fundamentally rely on specific threats or adversaries, as well as
on fairly rigid sets of individual U.S. military units that are allocated and envisioned for
employment. The warplans provide a script for what forces are going to be deployed,
how they are going to get to the theater of operations, what they are going to do once
they get there, and how they are going to do it. The question theater CINC planners ask
with respect to AJFP and capabilities-based planning is: "If we don't know with any
certainty which forces we'll be handed in a time of crisis (or for forward presence), how
can we possibly plan for their employment in any meaningful fashion?"
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Theater CINCs appear at this point unable (or unwilling) to commit to producing
comprehensive, detailed lists of :apabilities-based requirements of the kind that would
be useful for determining what size and mix of forces ought to be assigned to their
respective AORs for presence, or crisis response. As one participant in the First
Adaptive Joint Force Forward Presence Conference pointed-out, "[w]ithout these
requirements, it is impossible to pick capabilities from the tool box.s5 7 As indicated in
the previous discussion of JMETLs, there is not even an appropriate, common set of
terms, or "dictionary" available with which to begin such a process.
In some ways, this lack of commitment to capabilities-based planning on the part of
overseas CINCs is understandable. If nothing else, their pattern of planning over the
past decades has been based on specific threats, and on a detailed list of units allocated
for their use. With a clear understanding of exactly what forces were promised, which,
in the case of for forward presence was a full CVBG plus MARG combination, there
appears to have been little need, or support, for capabilities-based planning. Rapidly
changing an in-grained pattern such as this is obviously difficult, and requires an
underlying justification that is both understood and accepted. Unfortunately, as far as
the overseas CINCs are concerned, such a clear justification for capabilities-based
planning has not been demonstrated. This criticism thus appears to relate not so much
to an inability on the part of the CINCs to change to capabilities-based planning, but
rather a skepticism that such planning will work and produce positive results.
In the opinion of this researcher, this concern may have considerable validity. Take,
for example Gulf War. It would -eem that the extremely detailed planning CENTCOM
had on-file as part of this country's large-scale Middle East warplan was indispensible
to the successful conduct of operations. Although the plan was clearly not adhered to
57This lack of clear, detailed, capabilitie,-based requirement statements from the overseas CINCs was
highlighted in US. Atlantic Command, Major Points and Analysis: First Adaptive Toint Force Forward
Presence Conference. That report even indicated that the Theodore RooseveI/SPMAGTF deployment
had no EUCOM statement of requiremcnts upon which its development was based.
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precisely, either in terms of ftw ,es that were deployed, or how they were eventually
employed, it provided a ready-made blueprint for starting the process of bringing
forces into the theater, and later, the maimer in which they were used.5 8 It has been
suggested that without that blueprint, the whole process might have taken twice as
long, and could have led to much less satisfactory results.59 Although AJFP is clearly
oriented toward contingencies below the Gulf War-MRC level, the same reservations
with capabilities-based planning seem to be applicable.
There is however a compelling argument in favor of USACOM's call for
capabilities-based planning and Force allocation. In particular, the significantly smaller,
post-Cold War U.S. force structu re simply will not allow the overseas CINCs to count-
on a fixed, detailed, specific set -f forces designated for their sole use. Henceforth, the
supporting CINCs (in this case USACOM) will have to managg a smaller pool of assets
against the competing demands of multiple theater warfighters.
E. TAILORING AND PEACETIME FORWARD PRESENCE
At this writing, we are involved in operations Provide Promise, Maritime Guard, and Deny
Flight in the Adriatic Sea; operation Southern Watch in the Persian Gulf; and operation Restore
Hope in Somalia. This involvement illustrates the inherent flexibility, utility, and global reach of
naval forces in supporting important national taskings.
(Vice Admiral Leighton W. Smith, in Carriers For Force 2001.)
According to General Powell, one of the initial, defining objectives of the AJFP
concept was to create efficiencies, by tailoring force packages to specific regions and/or
missions, especially for forward presence. While this may be possible and appropriate
with certain static, ground-based, and limited-objective forward presence forces, many
"8According to Bob Woodward, The Commanders, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), the original
CENTCOM 1002 Operations Plan called for 150,0M) or so troops, much less than the over half a million
that were deployed.
59 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Conress. (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1992), D-7.
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have voiced skepticism over the dea of tailoring being inserted into the type of forward
presence operations that have been the domain of naval forward deployments over the
past few decades. In particular, it has been argued that these deployments were
specifically designed to provide just the opposite of what tailoring implies. In other
words, they were i nall developed to provide a capability that is supremely
flexible with regard to mission a rid region, while purposefully avoided a focus on any
one AOR or conflict scenario.
The rationale for such flexibility is relatively straight-forward. Simply consider that
a rotationally deployed CVBG and/or MARG package may one week be evacuating
non-combatant civilians in Haiti or Liberia, or enforcing a no-fly-zone in the Adriatic.
The next week, it may be sent off to the Horn of Africa to provide humanitarian
assistance. Next, the same "package" may be ordered to conduct long-range air strikes in
the Persian Gulf, or provide disaster relief in Bangladesh. This is the way that naval
forces have been used in the "real-world." It follows that some overseas theater CINC
planners question the viability of tailoring rotationally-deployed, continuous forward
presence force packages either for particular regions or specific missions.
This criticism appears to have basis in fact. Problems with tailoring CVBGs and
MARGs were encountered most recently when the Theodore Roosevelt battlegroup was
pulled away from its intended EUCOM/Mediterranean operating environment and
sent through the Suez Canal to support CINCCENT. It appears that some CENTCOM
staff officers were unhappy with some of the tailoring that had been done with the
formation, and felt that the traditional CVBG mix of capabilities would have been more
appropriate. 6° Similarly, when the USS Tripoli MARG was repositioned to the waters
off of Somalia, some felt that the MARG's tailoring, with the resultant lack of sufficient
6°Case in point was one Central Command Naval Component (NAVCENT) staff officer who lamented in
a telephone interview the absence of the Theodore Roosevelt's F-14s to support the "Southern Watch,"
UN-mandated enforcement of a no-fly zone in southern Iraq, as well as the lack of S-3s to serve as long-
range COD platforms.
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armor and over-the-beach lift capabilities in particular, affected the embarked MEU's
readiness to respond decisively.-'
While only a few concrete examples have been provided, they serve to highlight
some likely problems associated with tailoring regularly deployed, continuous
peacetime presence packages. If iaothing else, they probably reflect a need to reexamine
the concept of region or mission-specific peacetime presence and the envisioned
practice of tailoring the forces that will carry-out that mission.
F. LACK OF USE, AND NO "VALUE ADDED"
Most often the forces that were used for these "presence" missions, as well as most other
activities, came from the standing U.S. deployments nearby.
(Force Without War, by Blechman and Kaplan.)
There is concern among some planners that USACOM's CONUS-based force
packages will not readily be used, even if and when they are eventually developed and
trained. This belief is held for a number of reasons. Some people argue that in virtually
overseas crises, the forces that are already deployed in-theater are the ones that will be
directed to address the situation, both in the short-term, and over the long run.
Certainly, this view reflects the American crisis response pattern of the past, i.e. the
propensity to respond to virtually all smaller contingencies - regardless of their
particular nature - with the forces that were positioned forward already. Proponents of
this claim cite, as recent examples, both Bosnia and Somalia. In both instances, forward
stationed and, in particular, forwvard deployed naval forces were the first to respond.
The latter, of course, continue to provide the bulk of U.S. military presence in and
around those situations. In the case of Bosnia, even the Air Force assets that were based
at Aviano and elsewhere in Italy, were drawn almost exclusively from units already
61For a discussion of the Lo TripolM ARG experience, see Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., "The Marine Corps
of Tomorrow," USNI Proceeding. November 1993, 28., and William T. DeCamp III and Kenneth F.
McKenzie, "A Hollow Force?", USNI ProLg in', November 1993,40.
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forward positioned in Germany., 2 Furthermore, when President Clinton again escalated
the U.S. presence in Somalia in ()ctober 1993, the vast majority of the additional forces
came in the form of a rapidly repositioning a carrier battle group and amphibious ready
group that were already deployed overseas. 63
Another aspect of the "lack of use" concern revolves around the suspicion that
internal, military institutional struggles will continue to determine the composition of
crisis response force packages. Ii other words, it is felt that certain - unavoidable - DoD
organizational and political interests will ultimately outweigh, or dramatically modify,
USACOM's AJFP planning and employment processes, and determine what units are
sent where and when. Those articulating this concern point to the "politically
determined" use of the New York-based 10th Mountain Division for operations in
Somalia,64 and the "inappropriate," selection of forces for the Grenada invasion. 65
Yet another dimension to the argument that already forward positioned forces will
be the ones, in fact, to respond to overseas crises, pertains to the belief that mobilizing
and deploying CONUS-based forces is politically much more difficult than simply
repositioning forces that are already forward positioned. It is claimed that the former
step generates considerably more attention in the press" and in the halls of Congress,
6 2Neff Hudson and Steve Vogel, "Limitod Threat Seen for Allies Enforcing No-Fly Zone in Bosnia," Air
Force Times, 19 April 1993, 15.
63Michael Elliot, "The Making of a Fiasc i," Newsweek 18 October 1993, 34.
64The "inappropriateness" of deploying the 10th Mountain Division to Somalia was a view articulated in
numerous "off-the-record" telephone interviews, but is not backed-up by any published public statements
to that effect, official or unofficial. In tho se interviews, it was indicated that the 10th was deployed for
"Provide Hope" as a consolation for not being used in "Desert Storm."
6 5John W. Vessey, Jr., "JCS Replies to Criticism of Grenada Operation," Anmy, August 1984.
66 As an example of this phenomena, co'nsider that Air Force units recently deploying from stateside
bases to Italy to participate in the "Den) Flight" operation over Bosnia received considerable attention and
fan-fare in the national press, while littl- or no attention was paid to the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air
Force units (from Germany) that had been poised in the area continuously for the past year or more. CNN
bmadcat of 29 November 1993 which highlighted the deployment of CONUS-based Air Force Reserve F-
16s to Italy.
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and therefore will present a more weighty decision for the National Command
Authority. The likely result, accilrding to some AJFP critics, will be that effective, well
trained, mission-specific force packages will oftentimes remain idle at their stateside
bases, while untrained, adhoc ctombinations of forward positioned forces are assigned
to the tasks for which AJFP packages were specifically developed.
Another concern is that AJFPIs focused, in-advance organizing and training, i.e. the
"ofvalue added," will never comphutely materialize. To begin with, it is argued that two of
the USACOM components assigned to develop and oversee the packages (ACC and
FORSCOM) do not have, and are not anticipated to receive, the additional staff
personnel required by their new AJFP-related functions. It has been indicated to this
researcher that this concern is exacerbated by the fact that these organizations have now
been given significant warfighting responsibilities in addition to their traditional service
roles of organizing, training, and equipping troops. It is also feared that the core-AJFP
package staffs, once organized a nd trained, will evaporate or diffuse (along with their
"corporate knowledge") more quickly than they can be re-generated. High turn-over
rates have historically been the plight of most active military organizations.
An additional concern rela rt s to uncertainty about the make-up of the designated
JTF commanders and accompanying staffs that will be trained within the AJFP system.
In particular, some question whether overseas theater commanders and staffs will
participate heavily in the package, training process. As such, those who might ultimately
direct the efforts of AJFP packages once deployed may not benefit from the value added
of the AJFP concept. Even more importantly, they may not be able to incorporate
quickly the specific procedures formalized during pre-deployment package training.
It appears that the critics have much to support their arguments. Certainly, if the
previous pattern of American crisis response is a telling factor for the future, then
already forward positioned forces will continue to bear the brunt of smaller overseas
contingencies. The military's own National Military Strategy (NMS) points out that the
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Nation's forward presence is "the leading edge of our crisis response capability," and
"often the most responsive in cases of natural disaster or regional crisis." 67 The NMS
appears to point out the obvious: why have those forces "over there" if not to respond to
crises? Conversely, deploying a special force from CONUS each and every time a
problem arises overseas, does not seem particularly "efficient," or the best use of
available resources. No doubt also, the argument that deploying a CONUS-based
package will be more difficult p 4litically than repositioning already forward stationed
or deployed forces has considerable merit.
Having said this, it needs nevertheless to be recalled that the post-World War II
pattern of American crisis response evolved in an environment where AJFP did not
exist, and when specially trained, mission-specific joint force packages were not always
available. It may be that the development of such packages alone will be sufficient to
change old habits and justify the deployment of CONUS-based forces for certain
contingencies. In any case, the 'old" pattern may already be in flux, for recent crises
have seen a greater resort to CONUS-based forces. Notably, the majority of the U.S.
forces sent to Somalia (at the hight of that operation) were sent directly from the United
States as a mission-specific deployment. Considering that peace-support, nation-
building, disaster relief, and other such non-traditional operations appear to be the
focus of USACOM's current AJFP menu, it may be that CONUS-based, mission-specific
force package deployments are something to be encountered more often in the future
than in the past.
As far as the worry that AJFP-trained commanders and staffs will diffuse more
rapidly than they can be reconstituted, or that overseas combatant command officers
will not be involve sufficiently in AJFP training, this may reflect a tendency to claim
defeat before the task has even been attempted. Simply put, if those in charge of AJFP's
67 Poweli, National Military Strategy, 14.
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development and maintenance are determined to make the system work (and have the
necessary "power" delegated to them), then it appears likely that they will eventually
be able to overcome these reservwtions.
G, TRADITIONAL VS. NON-TRADITIONAL MISSIONS
*.. instead of using the peacetime interregnum to hone their military skills, senior military
officers sought civilian missions to iustifil their existance. When war came they were woefully
unprepared. Instead of protecting t1teir soldiers' lives they led them to their deaths. In today's
post-Cold War peacetime environnint, this trap again looms large... Some today within the
U.S. military are also searching for rel'vance, with draft doctrinal manuals giving touchy-feely
prewar and postwar civil operations equal weight with warfighting. This is an insidious mistake.
(Harry Summers, as quoted in The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012.)
The debate over "non-traditional" missions for America's military is one that
appears to be gaining more momentum as time goes on. While it has been most visible
within the Nation's political and journalistic communities, it has also begun to generate
considerable controversy withini the active military as well - albeit somewhat less
publicly. Although skepticism with such employment for U.S. forces is discussed here
under a common heading, and though it has commonly been addressed as a single
topic, the issue of traditional versus non-traditional military missions can be more
effectively addressed as a combination of separate, yet inter-related questions.
To begin with, there is the general question of whether or not the U.S. military
should be employed for other than traditional, "war-fighting," or combat tasks. Next is
the question of, if the armed forces are to be so employed, should they spend significant
time and energy preparing for non-traditional missions? In addition, concern also
emerges about the ability of the military to improve measurably their performance in
some of these mission-areas through the more mission-focused preparation envisioned
by AJFP.
Because this researcher's own analysis and conclusions about this issue are largely
included in the final two chapters of this thesis, the discussion here merely presents the
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arguments of those concerned with the use of American military force for non-
traditional missions, and criticising AJFP on the basis of its apparent non-traditional
mission focus.
It seems undeniable that AJF P is, at this point, "heavily preoccupied" with so-called
non-traditional missions. Although USACOM insists that the concept was originally
intended for virtually the entire range of contingencies at the lower-end of the military
spectrum, including a wide range of LRCs, and has indicated that this is still the plan,
the first AJFP menu now being developed consists, as noted earlier, largely of non-
traditional mission options. Among the 13 packages included in the intial menu, at least
nine can be characterized as non-traditional - that equates to almost 70% of AJFP's
preliminary planning efforts. For what its worth, this researcher has considered the four
missions of NEO, No-Fly Zone Enforcement, Quarantine/Blockade, and Forward
Presence as traditional missions. As such, the remaining missions are, for the purposes
of the following discussion, characterized as non-traditional.
General arguments against the employment (and/or training) of America's military
forces for many non-traditional missions seem, at this point, fairly well known.
Although the public debate on this issue does not specifically cite AJFP, it is logical to
assume that that those opposing non-traditional missions would render similar verdicts
about AJFP's initial non-traditional mission focus. Unfortunately, there are few, if any,
quotable statements available from active military officers that tie such non-traditional
mission concerns directly to AJI-P. This is not to say that such direct tie-ins were not
made - they were. It only indicates that they have either not been written down and
published, or were given to this researcher on the condition that they remain
anonymous or "unattributed."
The overall argument against non-traditional employment and training for U.S.
military forces does not appear to reflect a single line of reasoning, or any one set of
underlying rationales. To begin with, there are those who argue simply that any such
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operations - if conducted overseas - are a drain on limited American assets and
resources that some indicate are iieeded here in the United States. The arguments are as
rudimentary as "why feed Sonialis on the Horn of Africa when we have our own
starving citizens in every major city here at home?"
Next, there are also those wh-o argue that non-traditional employment will detract
from the military's more traditional - and "more important" - combat roles and
missions. For what it is worth, this argument is often made completely apart from the
question of whether or not the armed forces can effectively accomplish such missions.
In any case, this opinion can be summarized by statements such as "[iut's possible to get
so lost in humanitarian concerns that that the country could float off into oblivion,.., at
the expense of undermining America's own national security."68 For those who hold
these views, there appears to be little room for regularly employing U.S. forces for
missions like peacekeeping, riot-control, humanitarian relief, etc., whether it be
overseas, or in the United States itself.
Thirdly, there are those who argue that, even if it is decided to routinely use
American military forces for non-traditional tasks, this should not entail an equal
commitment to training and preparation for those tasks. In other words, the armed
forces would go ahead and carry out its new, unconventional operations, but should
treat them much as they have been treated in the past, i.e. as "lesser included tasks."
A forth and final argument holds that no matter how much U.S. military forces
train and prepare for such missiins (and no matter how important they may be to U.S.
interests), they are likely to be doomed to failure. The reasoning behind this argument
appears to be a view that many of the situations at which these operations are directed
are fundamentally unsuited to the application of military forces. This reasoning is
offered most often, of course. for the missions of peacekeeping, peacemaking,
68Former Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, as quoted in Neil C. Livingstone, "The Dangers of Doing
G0od," Sea Power August 1993, 25.
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humanitarian assistance and nation-building, and somewhat less so at specific, one-time
disaster relief operations. In any c-ase, all four arguments say a great deal about concepts
like AJFP, which intends to apply considerable planning time and training resources to
these new missions. The obviou., goal of AJFP is, of course, to do these missions better
in the future than they have been done in the past.
H. "LOCKS-IN' A LIMITED SET OF OPTIONS
Now, there are four ways of doing a thing aboard ship - the right way, the wrong way, the
Navy way, and my way. I want thiný's on this ship done my way.
(Captain Queeg in The Caine Munity)
To some, the term "menu" appears to mean a limited, indeed limiting set of options,
i.e. options that may fall short of addressing the particulars of specific contingencies.
Moreover, it is often suspected that, despite the insistence on flexible "crisis response"
package processes, the AJFP menu will eventually become a static, confining list of
choices with neither flexibility nor adaptivity. One AJFP critic drew the analogy of a
restaurant that advertised dishe.s made to order, but which when confronted with a
non-menu request notified a customer, 'We can accomodate special orders, but we don't
like to."
The obvious counter to the above line of reasoning is to point out the D=Ly limiting
set of options that the previous, non-AJFP system provided. Not only does it appear
that, in the past, j=t large-scale contingency warplans were given significant attention
by theater CINC plannings, but also that most smaller-scale plans (LRC CONPLANS
and FDOs) were relegated to the "bottom drawer." 69 This "lack of options" problem was
noted in Bob Woodward's The Commanders, which indicated that former
69This was the impression generated ditring face-to-face interviews with CENTCOM planners, who
focused almost exclusively on the comniand's two, large-scale OPLANS.
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President Bush was displeased with the limited range of military options offered to him
during the 1989 Panama and 1990 Kuwait crises. 70
The "old" system also appears to have provided relatively few smaller-scale,
mission-specific joint force packages, or JTF commanders and staffs, on-the-shelf, well-
trained, and ready to deploy aid operate in the less predictable, and less traditional
post-Cold War, joint operating onvironment. Instead of limiting the overseas CINCs'
and National Command Authority's options, AJFP appears to expand the range of
available military responses (especially at the low and non-traditional end of the
spectrum) and increase the level of confidence that those responses will be rapid, well
coordinated, and better trained for the contingencies at hand.
L DISPLACES TRAINING BUDGETS
Combined exercises between U S. and regional forces provide a foundation for developing
strong military-to-military relations and future coalitions.
(U.S Central Command: Issues. Challenges and Strategy.)71
Some commentators on AJFP fear that USACOM's designation as a single, official
joint force integrator will draw joint training dollars away from the overseas theater
CINCs, as well as away from the individual Services. The contention here is the portion
of the total "pot" of training money that is given each year to the CINCs and the
Services, which is specifically allocated for joint training (as opposed to "Title 10"
service-specific training).
This appears to be a particular concern for the overseas CINCs who rely on these
joint training dollars, not so much to improve jointness, but to conduct multi-national
training exercises that are an integral part of their overseas "engagement" forward
70Bob Woodward, The Commanders. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991)
71U.S. Central Command, US Cntalommand: Issues. Challengo and Strategy, (Tampa: date
unknown), 6.
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presence mission. In one sense, these training exercises (funded by the joint training
budget now in question) are an ertd in themselves. Taking away their funding is seen as
a direct threat to an overseas CINC's ability to carry-out his on-going presence mission.
Although it is difficult to predict with any certainty the extent to which USACOM's
new joint training role might displace training budgets away from the other Unified
CINCs and the individual ser' ices, it appears likely that some displacement will
occur. 72 By the same token however, a considerable increase in the Atlantic Command's
joint training budget (and a corresponding decrease for the services and overseas
theater commands) appears logical given the considerable expansion in joint training
authority and responsibility associated with USACOM's new joint force integrator and
AJFP development roles.
K. ATLANTIC VS. PACIFIC COMMAND PACKAGING
This provides all the benefits of forward presence - engagement, deterrence, influence, and
rapid reaction - along with the flexibility to rapidly adjust or adapt to change.
(Admiral Charles R. Larsoa, in United States Pacific Command Posture Statement
In his May 1993 Posture Statement, 73 the Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC)
Admiral Charles Larson outlined his plans for addressing the changing strategic
environment in the Pacific region. Part of that vision included concepts that appear to
correspond closely to many elements of USACOM's AJFP initiative. According to
Admiral Larson:
7 2Some substantial displacement was indicated (especially away from the Services) during telephone
interviews with Joint Staff J-7 (Training, staff officers.
7 3Charles R. Larson, United States Pacific Command Posture Statement 1993 Camp H. M. Smith: 1993.
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We can tailor forces for spec tfic challenges by pulling them from Forward Bases
on U.S. territory (Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, etc.), or afloat in the Eastern Pacific, or
from USPACOM forces based in the continental U.S. We can even draw on forces
from other CINCs. I call this process of rapidly tailoring forces to the specific
mission "Adaptive Presence." 4
The Pacific CINC also in ;cated that because of an increasing array of missions,
decreasing availability of asset:., and constantly evolving threats in the theater, his
command has "amassed more than two years of experience in adapting mobile force
packages.. ."7s As examples, Larson pointed to "the Pacific Fleet's now-routine practice
of forming battle groups with fewer escort ships, and dispersing battle group assets to
provide military-to-military contacts with as many foreign nations as possible," as well
as the recent deployment of the USS Tripoli Amphibious Task Unit, which replaced a
few ot its amphibious ships witih a Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) stocked with
supplies and equipment for air-delivered, follow-on forces. 76
Akin to USACOM's "value added" concept of providing pre-crisis training and
exercising to designated AJFP co mmanders and staffs, the PACOM posture statement
also noted an ongoing CINCPAC-sponsored exercise program designed to
institutionalize the joint training required to field flexible, tailored Joint Task Forces on
short notice. This progam includes detailed classes, computer assisted exercises,
command post exercises, and realistic deployments for the joint forces and commands
identified as being likely to be called on in a crisis.
Given the concepts and initiatives outlined in Admiral Larson's posture statement,
it appears that PACOM and USACOM are headed in some of the same directions. One
question that arises is why the PACOM initiatives have not received the same attention





seem appropriate include: are the two approaches of these commands the same, or are
they significantly different? Is one better than the other? And does one promise to
initiate (and demand) more drastic and difficult changes than the other?
There appear to be four notable differences between the PACOM Atlantic
Command programs. First, USACOM seems to have attracted a great deal more
attention to its force packaging initiatives than has PACOM. It might be said that the
Norfolk command has actively ,olicited - by virtue of Admiral Miller's many recent
public statements - the greater publicity, and must accept the implications (both good
and bad) that increased visibilitN and notariety entail. PACOM's activities, on the other
hand, have not resulted in a floo'd of press coverage, or military and civilian political
attention. As such, successes (and failures, if any) have escaped significant publicity.
A second difference lies in tlie nature of both commands themselves. The Atlantic
Command has become primarily a force provider, or supQrting CI.C. PACOM, on the
other hand, is both a force u=r, ALd a force provider by virtue of its twin tasks of
having to provide both itself and CENTCOM with forces. One possible implication of
this distinction is that, should PACOM encounter problems with its force packaging
initiatives, they might, in fact, remain an "internal" matter, with any "blame" or
criticism self-imposed. This is not possible, of course, if CENTCOM is involved and
finds itself supplied with PACOM forces with which it is less than satisfied. In contrast,
USACOM's force packaging concepts will almost always involve another unified CINC,
and any criticism created will not readily be containable within the Atlantic
organization.
Thirdly, it appears that the, what some have considered, "radical" nature of
USACOM's first public packaginig exercise (the CV/SPMAGTF mix) prompted a great
deal more attention than may have been warranted, or ultimately desired. Nevertheless,
the episode serves to provide a contrast to PACOM's USi rip.li packaging initiative.
Possibly due to the unique circumstances and timing of the Somalia operation,
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indications are that this tailored naval formation worked satisfactorily and generated
only minor hind-sight "grumbling." 77
Finally, the sheer magnitude of recent changes at the Atlantic Command (new roles,
the addition of ACC and FOR'COM, etc) has certainly played a part in focusing
attention on that organization's activities. Added to that is the fact that USACOM's
primary supported region, the Mediterranean, is experiencing changes and crises that,
so far at least, appear to be significantly more challenging than those that have
characterized the Pacific area.
While the preceeding discussion has been provided as part of this chapter's broader
discussion of the criticisms that have been leveled against AJFP, it may not truly be a
part of the type of anti-AJFP concerns outlined previously. It marks, more
appropriately, concern that the Xtlantic Command and the Pacific Command may be
pursuing innovative force packaging initiatives on what are seen as two separate,
uncoordinated tracks. The result may be that neither the overseas force package users,
i.e. the theater CINCs, nor the individual services who provide the basic force building-
blocks, will be able to adjust well to two different systems.
L MORE ON THE THEODORE ROOSEVELT/SPMAGTF
Can I place a small number of tailor-made Marines on a carrier? The answer is yes. Would
I, personally, want to do that? No There are tradeoffs for both services that I believe are not
worth the effort. There will be some missions we can do, and may do, but I don't think this is a
viable option for repetitive deployments.
(LCOL Ray Young USMC, Executive Officer of the Theodore Roosevelt-embarked
SPMAGTF)
It has already been noted that objections to the CV/SPMAGTF combination (with
the attendant "dilution" of the &ii4an-centered MARG) were many. The Marine Corps'
concern over the long-term doctrinal impact on its traditional MEU building-block was
77For the objections that h=v been published regarding PACOM's USS Tripoli package, see McKenzie,
"T'he Marine Corps of Tomorrow," and DeCamp, "A Hollow Force."
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addressed in an earlier section or this paper. Other concerns were voiced as well. They
ranged from skepticism about the SPMAGTF's real mission capability (which was
characterized by some as "extremely limited" and not equal to the concept's original
advertisement), to complaints about the reductions imposed on the CV's embarked
airwing. In addition, there were concerns that the SPMAGTF's effectiveness would be
constrained by the CV's propensity to operate in "blue-water" vice "brown-water."
Ironically, there was also the seemingly opposite concern that the CV's effectiveness
and survivability would be jeopardized by the need to remain close to shore while
supporting the SPMAGTF.78
There were also those who "oiced criticisms about the decreased capability of the
deployed MARG (from which the SPMAGTF was drawn), should it have been needed
for any significant real-world contingencies. And there were criticisms of this "Task
Force 93-1" not being a true test of the ability to provide forward presence with fewer
assets - a reference to its simultaneous deployment of both a CVBG and a MARG. 79
There was finally the proposal that alternative (and better) ways existed to provide the
same capability without deploying Marines on a CV and without altering the MARG's
basic compostion. In particular, EUCOM staff officers indicated that they would have
preferred to rely on already in-place, ground-based special operations and rapid
reaction forces to provide the limited, yet very focused, mission-specific capability for
which the SPMAGTF was envisioned.
It is important to note that although the Theodore Roosevelt, CV/SPMAGTF
combination was "worked-up" for months in the Navy's stateside test-ranges prior to
deployment, it was also immediatedly sent off overseas to "the front lines." In that
sense, it was not merely a laboratory test-case, with its "warts" simply jotted-down and
78 McKenzie, 'The Marine Corps of Tomo trrow."
79In the mind of this researcher, this is , significant observation, and indicates that the naval units
deployed to the Mediterranean in the So immer of 1993 were not a valid example of "making do with less."
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filed away in an after-action ext rcise report. The Theodore Roosevelt was, in essence,
thrown from the frying pan into the fire when it became the United States' primary on-
call asset to deal with the quagnr ire of Bosnia. Some have suggested that, in retrospect,
the past year may have not beetn the best time to be "mucking" with the Navy and
Marine Corps' time-proven concepts and systems. To put this a different way, or in a
more sympathetic light, it may have been somewhat unfortunate that AJFP's initial
introduction came both, in the form of an almost purely naval version of packaging, and
as part of a real-world, forward dteployment. The implication is that AJFP's introduction
would have been more appropriate had it been both a one-time training exercise
involving a fully multi-service ioint force package. As such, the various drawbacks
and/or limitations of the CV-ba,,,ed SPMAGTF concept all appear to have been greatly
magnified by the context in which they were discovered. As well, many of those who
disliked the Theodore Roosevelt deployment appear to have formed a negative opinion
of AJFP as a whole on the basis of their concerns with that first, initial force packaging
evolution.
In contrast to most of the other AJFP-related concerns outlined in this chapter, and
similar to the approach taken with the discussion of non-traditional missions, an
analysis and preliminary critique of the concerns associated with the CV/SPMAGTF
option is not presented here. It is provided separately in the next chapter.
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IV. FUNDAMENTAL AJFP THEMES AND QUESTIONS
The past four years have been historic ones. So many changes have occured that it is hard to
chronicle them without losing a listener's attention. We have lived through a time that historians
will labor over for decades to com., trning to sort out the heroes from the villains, fact from
fiction, and momentous from trivial or transient events.
(Colin L. Powell, in Joint Force Ouarterly.)
The preceding two sections have provided an overview of the many claims, both
positive and negative, that have been made about AJFP and the "new" U.S. Atlantic
Command. If there remain questions about what AJFP actually is (or is not), or about
what these developments really mean for the use of U.S. military forces in the future,
this is not surprising. USACOM planners themselves, along with most other concerned
parties, admit that the concepts a-re still in their infancy and will continue to evolve as
time goes on.
Nevertheless, from the view point of this researcher, some fundamental questions
and/or themes emerge. This section introduces and describes those questions or
themes, and in the process, outlines what appear to be the implications for what AJFP
can and cannot do, as well as for where it should and should not be applied. In support
of the analysis, an additional, abbreviated look at the Theodore Roosevelt/SPMAGTF
deployment is provided. This is done not only because that deployment is considered
the first and only real-world application of USACOM's adaptive force planning
concepts, but also because it addressed what appears to be the most pressing challenge
that precipitated AJFP's development - i.e. providing continuous forward presence in a
time of major fleet reductions.
The first set of questions that emerges from researching this topic of adaptive joint
force packaging, can be introduced best by examining what appear to be the underlying
factors behind its creation. On the one hand, there appears to be a need to simply do
61
things better - or more effectively. This need arises not only because the United States
military has failed to conduct so me assigned operations (especially smaller, heavily-
joint operations) with maximum effectiveness in the past, as well as because its strategic
focus has shifted from global war with the former Soviet Union to smaller regional
conflicts with unidentified opponents, but also because it has been handed a range of
new, non-traditional missions for which it has relatively less planning and practical,
operational experience. On the tither hand, there is also a growing need to do things
much more efficiently - or with tewer available resources. This applies most notably to
the mission of continuous peace time forward presence outside of Central Europe and
East Asia, which has traditionally been met with naval task groups centered around
now-dwindling Navy aircraft carriers and large-deck amphibious assault ships.
Having indicated earlier this researcher's belief that increased efficiency in the
forward presence arena - i.e. doing things as well, or better, with fewer available assets -
is the most pressing challenge behind AJFP's development, it seems important to
substantiate that claim. For starters, Admiral Miller, and especially CJCS General Colin
Powell, provided initial descriptions of adaptive force packaging which focused on this
mission of forward presence. In fact, General Powell included his AJFP definition and
discussion within the forward presence section of the Roles and Missions statement,
and characterizing it as a way to "maintain essential forward presence at less overall
cost."
Aside from the four-stars' preliminary thinking on packaging, the seemingly
greater importance of providing forward presence with fewer assets (as compared to
doing smaller and non-traditional missions better) might also be substantiated by
examining the consequences of doing nothing - or not instituting something like AJFP.
With respect to achieving greater effectiveness at the (non-forward presence) lower-end
of the military force-use spectrum, the impact of doing things differently (vice the same
old way) might be difficult to measure. In fact, significantly different outcomes may not
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even result. In other words, the ultimately "successful" results achieved in operations
like "Urgent Fury," "Just Cause," or "Hurricane Andrew" might actually seem, or be
the same, whether carried out under the previous system or under the new AJFP
regime. Any differences in casualty-rates or levels of force required might conveniently
be chaulked-up to different circumstances, etc.
Similarly, the perceived lack of long-term success with problems like Bosnia or
Somalia may also not change -ignificantly with the implementation of new force
packaging initiatives and mission-focused training and exercising. If nothing else, even
if the United States experienced increased success in the future with such non-
traditional missions, it might be impossible to separate more effective political and
diplomatic processes, from force packaging, as the cause for that increased success.
On the other hand, the effect of doing nothing in the continuous forward presence
arena (in the face of smaller CV and large deck amphibious ship fleets) would be, and
has been, immediate and underuable. Whereas the United States previously had year-
round, on-scene CVBG and MARG coverage in each of three traditional deployment
areas, it now has incomplete, gapped, and "tethered" presence, a change that is neither
ambiguous nor unnoticed. Despite the above argument about the urgency of gaining
efficiencies in forward presence operations, as compared to achieving greater
effectiveness in other smaller and non-traditional missions, the fact remains that
USACOM's current AJFP working-menu is clearly focused less on forward presence
than some of its original conceptualizing predicted.
Thus, the basic questions that emerge appear to be the following. First, "Can
adaptive force packaging concepts help the American military respond more effectively
in an environment where, missions at the lower end of the conflict spectrum have taken
on greater importance, increased joint-service operations are indicated (indeed
mandated), and a range of non-traditional (and in many cases non-combat) tasks have
been added to the military's pallet?" And second, "Can these concepts assist in the
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provision of future, continuous peacetime military presence overseas, given the lower
post-Cold War numbers of Navy aircraft carriers and large-deck amphibious assault
ships - traditionally the bulworks of that mission?" Although the answer to both
questions appears to be yes, the reasoning behind those conclusions differs somewhat in
each case.
A. THE NEED FOR GREATER EFFECTIVENESS, AND THE LOWER-END OF THE
MILITARY-USE SPECTRUM
With respect to the need 'o do things better (or more effectively), the main
advantage of USACOM's adaptive force packaging concepts appears to be their
emphasis on prior planning, training and exercising - in AJFP parlance, the "value
added." While this applies to both traditional-type missions, and new, non-traditional
missions, it is worthwhile to first provide some explination and illustrative examples.
Because the U.S. military has, over the past few decades, focused primarily on
preparing for global war with the former Soviet Union, and also for large regional wars
such as the recent Gulf War, planning (and training) for smaller contingencies generally
took a back-seat. Now, such lower-scale operations, including the new, non-traditional
and non-combat missions, appear increasingly to be the Armed Forces future (day-to-
day) bread and butter. As a result, the missions or tasks for which the military will most
often be called upon to do, are also the ones for which they appear least prepared. AJFP
is one attempt to rectify that situa tion.
As indicated, this unpreparedness applies both to traditional missions (at the lower
end of the spectrum), and non-traditional missions. With regard to the former, the best
example is probably the 1983 Grenada operation, which, although ultimately successful,
encountered significant difficulties during its implementation. In particular, there were
problems with the multi-service nature of the forces involved, which in its purest form
meant that the forces of the different services could not even talk to one another. While
this, of course, was a function of incompatible communications systems, other critics of
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the 1984 "Urgent Fury" operation point to a considerable lack of pre-deployment
planning and coordination as a major source of difficulties. 80 But even more
importantly, the overall commander of the operation, and his planning and operations
staffs, appear to have had little or no experience - or specific prior training - for and
with some of the particular elements of the multi-service force that was ultimately
involved.8 1 Thus, the aspect of AJFP that envisions forming, training, and exercising
tailored packages (and in particular their designated core staffs) in advance of them
being needed, appears to have considerable merit.
It is important to highlight the fact that, in many cases, the actual composition of the
packages themselves may not be anything magic. In other words, the package that
might be listed on a hypothetical AJFP menu as say "invasion force for a small
Carribean island-nation," may in fact look almost identical to the force that was
employed in 1983, or the force that an assigned theater CINC would request even if
AJFP did not exist. The big difference is that under USACOM's new plan, AJFP should
be able to provide a joint force package - and a JTF commander and staff - that is
trained-up and ready to go for just such a specific type of operation.
With respect to the set of new, non-traditional missions that the military is now
being called on to perform, the same sense of less than optimal preparedness seems to
exist. Pertinent examples might include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
operations such as the initial Somalia mission, and the military's response to Hurricane
Andrew, as well as peacekeeping, peacemaking and/or nation-building efforts such as
Bosnia, or what the Somalia case has become. Here, the reference is not so much to the
problems encountered in Somalia that stem specifically from the political uncertainty
80Scott R. McMichael, "Urgent Fury: LA, king Back and Looking Forward," Field Artillery Tournal, March-
April 1985, 11-12.
81Ibid., 8-9. For other accounts of the Granada operation, see John W. Vessey, Jr., "JCS Replies to Criticism
of Granada Operation," A= August 1984., and Michael Duffy, "Granada: Rampant Confusion,"
Military Logistics Forum, July-August 1 985.
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and evolving mandate surrounding that operation, or similar problems resulting from
the political indecision about how much the federal government can and should
contribute to localized disaster relief, like in the Hurricane Andrew case. Instead, the
focus is primarily on the considerable difficulties encountered in simply deciding which
forces should be involved, standing-up and deploying those designated forces, and
getting the operations (including the command and control functions) off the ground
and on track.
In the Hurricane Andrew ,ituation, some of the military leadership assigned
appears to have had less than adequate experience working with the standard disaster
relief agencies (Red Cross, etc.), 4r with the other sister-service types of units that were
ultimately employed.8 2 In the Somalia case, a similar situation appears to have existed -
although in this case it was the lack of experience working with the UN and its
associated agencies, as well as with the plethora of private, international relief agencies,
that hampered much of the operation's initial efforts.83 With mission-specific AJFPs and
JTFs, it is envisioned that some of the problems encountered in Grenada, south Florida,
and Somalia will become less pronounced in similar, future operations.
Although only a few historical examples have been provided for where the U.S.
military could have done things better in the past, it appears that in a number of
previous American military operations (in particular at the lower end of the spectrum)
there has been a certain degree of what some have called "ad hocary." In other words,
because the vast majority of the military's planning and training was focused on global,
and major regional war-fighting, it has been argued that other "less demanding"
82Some of the criticisms aimed at the fe,' eral government's early response to Hurricane Andrew are
outline in Tom Morganthau, "Storm Warnings," Newsweek 14 September 1992, 25. Other indications of
inadequate preparation, especially as regards less than optimal utilization of available naval assets by the
operation's Army commanders were articulated during telephone conversations with FORSCOM staff
officers.
83This "lesson learned" was provided by during telephone conversations with Navy Staff officers
involved in the initial implementation of the Somalia operation.
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operations were often carried-otf "on the fly" and "by the seat of somebody's pants."
Thus, the prior planning and exercising that AJFP's authors intend to apply to these
now "more important," or at least more likely missions (both combat and non-combat),
appear to have a great deal of potential for increasing the military's effectiveness in
those areas.
B. THE NEED FOR GREATER EFFICIENCY, AND THE CONTINUOUS
PEACETIME FORWARD PRESENCE MISSION
As the 1992 National Military Strategy points out, operations of U.S. forces abroad
demonstrate American commitment, foster regional stability, lend credibility to
alliances, and enhance the ability of American (and foreign) forces to operate in multi-
lateral, international coalitions Collectively known as "forward presence," these
operations are considered essential to the United States' goals of deterring potential
aggressors, assuring friends and allies, and securing (and preserving) foreign-soil access
agreements. As well, it is indicated that the units so positioned are also the leading edge
of American crisis response capability, and often the most responsive in cases of natural
disaster and regional conflicts overseas.84
Over the past few decade's, American military presence overseas has been
characterized, in part, by the permanent stationing of large numbers of Army and Air
Force units in Europe and North-East Asia. Most of this permanent, ground-based
presence has been associated with firm security guarantees and formal (Cold War
driven) bi-lateral and multi-lateral defensive alliances. Added to this was the
continuous positioning of afloat naval forces in the three traditional deployment "hubs"
of the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Western Pacific. While the last of these
areas has been serviced by a CVBG, a MARG, and a full Marine Expeditionary Force
(MEF) permanently stationed in Japan, the others ("the Med" and "the 10") saw
84Colin L. Powell, National Military Stratey of the United States (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992), 14.
67
continuous afloat presence pro, ided by "rotational" deployments of CONUS-based
CVBGs and MARGs.
While the changed strategic situation vis a vis the former Soviet Union has
substantially reduced the need fo )r Cold War-era numbers of ground-based U.S. forces
in Europe and East Asia, and has resulted already in the scaling back of those forces, the
new global security environmeut appears to have had no such effect on the need for
forward positioned afloat (i.e. naval) forces. With regional instability and widespread
ethnic, religious, and political conflicts on the rise, and the drawdown of U.S. forces
permanently stationed abroad, -,ome argue, in fact, that rotationally deployed naval
forces will take-on even greater importance in the future.
The reasons behind the decidedly "naval" flavor of forward presence outside of
Central Europe and East Asia art- certainly no secret. For starters, the other regions were
not marked by long-term, unambiguous defensive alliances and "predictable"
operational situations that readily lend themselves to the introduction of permanent,
ground-based forces; naval forces availed U.S. decision-makers of a geographic and
mission flexibility that traditional Army and Air Force basing and operating patterns
lack. This characteristic of naval rorces still applies, and is central to the ongoing debate
over the Navy's future force structure.
The new naval force structure recommended by the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (which
calls for only eleven regularly deployable carriers and a similar number of large-deck
amphibious assault ships) will not support a continuing strategy of continuous, three-
area presence; at least not with traditional deployment patterns and "PERSTEMPO"
guidelines intact. Accordingly, i number of alternatives have been suggested. Some
have centered around using new and different combinations of naval platforms, many
of which do not include either a CV, a large-deck amphibious assault ship, or both.
While many of these alternative formations have already been exercised, in some cases
deployed during periods when CV or MARG coverage was gapped, the overseas
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CINCs continue to demand the traditional battlegroups, and have often protested
vociferously when provided witlh something else.85
Other suggestions have included measures like longer deployments, shorter turn-
around times, double crewing, additional overseas homeporting, etc. While these
options all have the potential to increase the on-station time of the naval service's major
deployable assets, and, in the case of longer cruises and shorter at-home periods, have
already been implemented to some extent, they all have certain limitations and side
effects that preclude them from becoming the overall solution to robust forward
presence with fewer deployable CVs and large-deck amphibious assault ships.
Yet another option is to increase the Army and Air Force's forward presence
participation in those regions where Navy and Marine Corps forces have traditionally
predominated. 86 AJFP is consistent with this line of thought. As indicated earlier, the
initial conceptualizing on AJFP not only focused on the forward presence issue, but also
envisioned taking advantage of "the full force multiplier of jointness." While some have
indicated that Army and Air Force forces can go along way toward supplementing (in
some cases substituting for) Navy and Marine Corps presence, others have claimed that
the Army and the Air Force cannot begin to take on the peacetime presence role of the
CVBGs, MARGs, or other naval formations. The next discussion is aimed at the many
concerns voiced over how much the Army and Air Force can and should do to help
with the problems created by smialler numbers of deployable naval assets.
85This appears to have been the case for CINCCENT, who, it is indicated, recently vented his displeasure
with proposals to allocate less than yeai -round CVBG coverage to his AOR.
86It is important to point out that this problem of too) few carriers and amphibious ships is not by any
means new. In fact, a 1978 Congression.ul Budget Office (CBO) report addressed this same problem and
responded with an almost identical set (,f possible solutions. See: Dov S. Zakheim and Andrew Hamilton,
U.S. Naval Forces: The Peacetime Presence Mission, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office,
December 1978). Fortunately, the Reagan-era build-up came along, with its target of a 600-ship Navy and
fifteen carriers, and the problem temporarily went away. For a more recent discussion of this issue, and
another analysis of the same set of alternatives, see: Ronald O'Rourke, Naval Forward Dcpovyuts and
the Size of the Navy, (Washington D.C. Congressional Research Service, 13 November 1992).
69
Concerns over the use of AJFP as a means to insert Army and Air Force units into
traditionally naval forward prese .nce roles are abundant. First, there are those who cite
the progressive reluctance of maiay foreign nations to host U.S. troops on their soil, and
claim that therefore, the necessary host-nation access will not be available. Others argue
that even when access is granted, the operational constraints imposed by land-basing
make Army and Air Force partici pation imprudent for the United States in any case. As
well, there are those who predict that the land-based nature of Army and Air Force
units will make them unable to produce the "wide-swath" deterrence and assurance
traditionally associated with geo graphically-flexible naval forces "showing the flag."
And finally, yet another group of opponents simply argues that these "garrison" forces
are not designed or equipped tor rotational deployments, and will never willfully
submit to the rigors that such deployments entail.
With those concerns in mind, it is worthwhile to first put the problems associated
with fewer naval assets in context, and then discuss briefly the range of forward
presence-related AJFP options available to address those problems; in particular those
options which include major Army and Air Force involvement. With regard to the size
of the fleet, even the reductions envisioned will still leave enough forces to provide a
significant amount of overseas presence. At the risk of oversimplifying the situation, a
straight-line reduction from the late 1980s target of fifteen deployable CVs and large-
deck amphibious assault ships (the number considered optimal to provide continuous
three-area CVBG and MARG coverage) to eleven of each would nevertheless retain the
ability to provide roughly 73% of the previous level of presence. Thus, the AJFP
presence that might be considered necessary to directly fill-in for unavailable CVBGs
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and MARGs would only involve a 27% "gap," or roughly three months of coverage in
each of the three traditional depl Wyment areas.87
So, the question becomes, what AJFP options are available to assist the Navy and
Marine Corps in their presence mission? While there are, of course, purely nava
packaging options, many of which promise to strengthen the Navy and Marine Corps'
ability to provide presence with fewer assets, they are not discussed at length here.
There are also options that en, ,sion using specific Army and/or Air Force assets to
provide traditional and unconventional naval formations with some particular, focused
capability that those formations alone lack. Examples of such options include the
already-employed tactics of using Air Force KC-135s to provide long-range aerial
refueling support to carrier-based aircraft, or deploying Army OH-58 missile-firing
helicopters aboard smaller naval combatants. Another possibility is deploying the
future Army Tactical Missile (AT ACM) system aboard naval ships.88 While the first two
initiatives have already shown their worth, and the latter option appear to hold some
promise as well, they truly seem to address the problem at its margins. In other words,
they are limited in scope, and d, ) not come close as substitutes for either the CVBG or
the MARG. As such, they too are not addressed further in this discussion.
Of course, there are aiso those options initially introduced in General Powell and
Admiral Miller's preliminary discussions of forward presence-related adaptive force
packaging - i.e. Air Force comp(,site air wings and Army airborne battalions filling-in
for CVBGs and MARGs respectively. In contrast to those cite above, these options do
appear to get at the heart of the problem, and therefore, provide a focus for this
analysis.
871f one region were to be given "prioritv" over the others, as has been suggested for CENTCOM's AOR,
then the CVBG/MARG gap to be filled would reside in larger measure in the other, "lower priority"
regions.
88 Robert Holzer, "U.S. Navy Turns Gunsights Ashore," D2fensNw 22-28 November 1993,4.
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In evaluating the capability of such substitutions to fulfill the roles traditionally
played by deployed naval formations, it is worthwhile to look again at what those
formations have typically prox ided. As indicated, they have provided deterrence
against potential aggressors, and assurance to regional friends and allies. They have
also helped to secure and preserve overseas, foreign-soil, access agreements. And
probably most importantly, they have provided the United States with an on-scene,
rapid response. military capability. Thus, the suggested Army and Air Force
substitutions for CVBGs and MARGs should be "critiqued" with the above four
forward presence missions in miicd.
Naval formations have -Also been credited with the ability to project forward
presence in a particular way that is reflective of what is commonly perceived as the
inherent advantage of afloat forces. In other words, during a single, typical deployment,
a CVBG and/or a MARG have been able to provide deterrence and assurance, and
affect access arrangements, acro,;s an entire area. They have done so by making many
port calls as they traversed a region (like the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, or Latin
America) from one end to the other. With regard to rapid crisis response, naval
formations have also been seen as unique. It is argued that they provided a unilateral
response or power projection capability that was not encumbered by any host-nation
employment limitations. These characteristics must also be examined closely when
evaluating possible Army and Air Force's participation in forward presence packaging
alternatives.
Looking at deterrence, assurance, and access, some have indicated their concern
that ground-based Army and Air Force deployments will not be able to provide the
"wide-swath," multi-nation assurance, deterrence, and access alluded to above. Such
skepticism appears to be due largely to these services' traditional overseas operating
patterns, which primarily invol% e only long-term or permanent, large-scale, single-site
deployments. Even when they are invoved in smaller-size deployments, these are
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typically for only one-time, mission-specific exercises in a particular nation. The
argument therefore, is that land-basing may severely limit the presence potential of
Army and Air Force package alternatives. In other words, their capacity for creating
assurance and securing access would be restricted to the country in which they were at
any one time located, and deterrence would be narrowly focused only on territorially
contiguous adversaries. One answer might be to move these forces around every few
weeks or so, from one country to another, in much the same way that naval
battlegroups traverse a region, showing the flag and conducting combined operations
along the way. In theory, not onl\E would this enable ground-based forces to provide the
kind of multi-country deterrence, assurance and access that naval forces have
traditionally provided, it might also preclude them from "wearing out their welcome"
in any one particular host-nation
Arguments against the viabiity of such mobile deployment schemes for the Army
and Air Force were articulated earlier. To repeat, it is uncertain whether foreign
countries will provide the necessary access for such deployments, and whether the
Army or the Air Force are indeed prepared to embark on such a high-tempo rotation
strategy. With regard to the first concern, it appears that perceptions of limited access
may be overblown. Recall that C VBGs and MARGs might be unavailable only during a
two or three month period each year. It follows that Army and Air Force substitution
would only be needed for that limited-duration period. If forces are moved about
frequently, their maximum stay in any one country might only be a week or two. And
finally, recent developments suggest that many countries may be more willing to accept
occasional, limited-duration deployments of ground-based U.S. forces than has been
predicted. 89
89Recent examples of this include the doployment of Air Force aircraft to Italy for the "Deny Flight"
operation and to Singapore, as well as Army deployments for training (DFTs) to Kuwait and elsewhere.
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It appears that skepticism over the Army and Air Force's ability (and willingness) to
deploy in other than their traditional, static role may be overstated as well. Both services
emphasize that they have units that are rapidly deployable, very mobile and extremely
flexible. With clear mandates to conduct such deployments, and with a force-providing
CINC as their overall commaader, such mobility and flexibility could be more
pronounced and more practiced as time goes on. There is, of course, also the question of
financial cost, which most indicate would be much higher for mobile, multiple-site
land-based Army and Air Force deployments than for the traditional naval
deployments which they would replace.
With all of these concerns in mind, and especially the final concern about exorbitant
monetary costs, USACOM planners appear to have settled on another method for fitting
land-based forces into the forward presence picture. In particular, they have proposed
that for periods when an Air Force composite wing is needed to fill-in for the standard
CVBG in, say, the Mediterranean, the various elements of the wing could be deployed
to a variety of nations in the region. For example, the wing's F-15s and aerial tankers
might be stationed in one country, its F-16s and elecronic jammers in a second, and its
reconnaissance and transport assets in yet a third country. Those planners indicate that
this is just the kind of plan that they are currently working on, and envision for
deployment in the 1995 time-frame.
Such innovative deployment schemes aside, the central focus of the arguments
against Army and Air Force units substituting for CVBG and MARG forward presence
relates to their questioned abilit) to provide the kind of unencumbered, on-scene rapid
crisis response capability that naval formations have traditionally provided. To be sure,
this reservation does not concern the sheer tecnical capability of Army and Air Force
units to carry-out the CVBG and MARG's power projection tasks. Clearly, given the
right mix of forces, a composite a ir wing can roughly bomb the same land targets that a
Navy carrier airwing can bomb , and in some cases, may even bomb them better). And
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given some additional training, thiev can surely attack the same sorts of maritime targets
that naval aircraft are trained to attack. Similarly (excepting some of the purely
amphibious tasks), an Army airborne or air assault unit could, theoretically, conduct
many (if not most) of the same sorts of operations advertised in the MARG's twenty-one
MEU/SOC capabilities. Again, in some cases, they might even be able to do some of
these things better.
Instead, concern revolves around the questional ability of Army and Air Force units
to conduct offensive operations w\,hen and where the United States' National Command
Authority deems necessary. In other words, the historic ability of afloat naval forces to
strike unilaterally and unconstriined by host-nation-imposed limitations may not be
sufficiently duplicated by their land-based counterparts. As such, critics of Admiral
Miller and General Powell's proposals to substitute CVBGs and MARGs with Army and
Air Force units, argue that even if access is secured, and even if the other services can be
packaged (and induced) to conduct such deployments, it is not in the best interests of
the United States to rely on thenm as a primary overseas crisis response capability. This
particular concern with USACOM's vision of AJFP appears to have considerable
validity, and will most surely create additional debate as the AJFP concept and overseas
forward presence demands unfold.
Before concluding the discutssion of forward presence and AJFP however, it is
worthwhile to make a few additional observations. The first has to do with the reasons
for American forward presence already mentioned, i.e. assurance, deterrence, access,
and crisis response capability. Specifically, it has to do with the relationship among and
between them. The common perception held by many appears to be that a strong crisis
response capability (either to punish a potential aggressor, or defend a friend or ally)
will provide the necessary deterrence and assurance. In turn, it is also often perceived
that that crisis response capability, by virtue of its ability to assure, will also secure and
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maintain the access agreements that the U.S. feels it needs. While this line of reasoning
might appear logical, it may also be less than accurate.
First and foremost, deterrenrce and assurance are fundamentally a function of
perceptions. When talking about overseas military presence, they are largely a function
of foreign, or non-U.S. perceptions. In other words, the on-scene power projection or
defensive capability that American military planners may consider adequate, and which
they feel should both deter and ,assure, may not be the same level or type of capability
that deters or assures overseas "target" nations. A case in point were the concerns noted
by CENTCOM planners during personal interviews with the author. It was pointed out,
for example, that the power proiection (TLAM) and air defense capabilities of Aegis-
class cruisers (considered by some in the United States as robust and worthy of respect)
may not be viewed as particularly reassuring by the Arab countries from whom the U.S.
is seeking access. In the end, the aircraft carrier was (and is) seen by America's Arab
friends and allies as the primary symbol of U.S. commitment and resolve. As such, and
interestingly, CINCCENT's recent demand for continuous, year-round CV coverage in
his AOR may have been less tied to a real, hard-core need for the carrier's capability (as
indicated officially), and more de.pendent on the perceptions of the target audience with
whom he is continually battling to preserve access agreements. 9o
Similarly, but at the other end of the spectrum, it was indicated that some Middle
East Arab decision-makers saw no difference between a standard, conventional aircraft
carrier, and an amphibious assault ship. Both were "thousand foot-long grey things
with aircraft flying off their decks." Although to a U.S. military planner, the two have
markedly (indeed overwhelmingiy) different capabilities, to some of the nations whom
the United States is attempting to assure, they apparently appear about the same. The
9OThis impression was reinforce by face-to-face interviews with CENTCOM planners. The message
conveyed continuously was that securing and preserving access agreements was the immediate, over-
riding objective pursued by that comm,,nd's long range planners.
76
perceptions of those who the t'.S. is trying to deter are certainly more difficult to
ascertain, but it is possible that the same disparity with American views exists.
A second observation that warrants noting, is that there appears to be little
agreement within the American defense establishment about how much forward
presence is needed, or for that matter, what level of assurance and deterrence is
achieved by different forward presence force options and various forward presence
operating alternatives. Certainly, as indicated in the previous chapter's discussion of the
limits of capabilities-based planning, the overseas CINCs have not yet been able to write
the "more accurate prescription" that USACOM is seeking - at least not as relates to
peacetime forward presence. As 'such, the current planning environment is one in which
traditional ideas about types a nd levels of forward presence have become highly
uncertain.
Uncertainty also surrounds the relationship, on the one hand, between the threats
that forward presence is designed to deter, and the assurance and access relationships
that it is to secure, on the other. In short, it appears most difficult to come to any
definitive conclusions about thc relative ability of non-traditional forward presence
packages to achieve the diverse objectives of American forward presence. At best, it
appears that heavy-Army and Ai r Force land-based packages have significant potential
to achieve deterrence, assurance, and access objectives (and in some cases more
effectively than afloat forces), 91 while having somewhat less promise to substitute for
naval force packages in fulfilling the nation's on-scene, unilateral, crisis response
capability needs.
91A number of sources solidify the commonly held belief that foreign-soil, ground-based forces send a
stronger signal of American commitment and resolve, by virtue of their inability to withdraw rapidly
from their positions. As such, it is perceived that Army and Air Force units are aften preferable for
deterring aggressors and assuring allie.- For more inforr ation on this issue, see Barry M. Blechman and
Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S. Armed Bo'- .-s as a Political Instrument. Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institute, 1978.
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There are, however, a number of additional activities, outside of the composite air
wing and airborne battalion alternatives discussed above, that have been described as
significant contributors to American forward presence. Many of these were introduced
in the January 1992 National Military Strategy, and were characterized as providing
presence over and above that provided by permanent stationing and continuous,
rotational naval deployments (or their equivalents). 92 They included access agreements,
prepositioning of equipment and supplies, security and humanitarian assistance, etc.
These options, many of which have be exercised already, also appear to have the
potential for supplementing more traditional forward presence operations. As such,
they too should be figured-into the overall forward presence calculation or equation.
C TRADITIONAL VS. NON-TRADITIONAL MISSIONS.
Chapter two presented Adm iral Miller and USACOM's perspective on the issue of
non-traditional missions, which, in general terms, indicates that so-called "peace-
promoting" missions are a natural extension of the armed forces' role in advancing
American security interests. This view maintains also that the use of military forces for
such missions will not come at the expense of their preparedness to meet "normal"
wartime requirements. Chapter three offered some contrasting opinions, notably the
complaint that such employment of America's armed forces is unnatural and ultimately
counter-productive for the vital national security interests of the United States.
With regard to the overall question of whether or not the U.S. military should be
used for non-traditional and/or non-combat missions, it is tempting to simply avoid the
issue altogether. In other words, one could relatively safely claim that it is not up to the
military to decide when and whe're it will be employed, or to define what are or are not
the vital interests of the United States. It could consequently be argued that the military
are merely responsible for preparing for and carrying-out the orders of its civilian
92 Powell, National Military Strategy, 14.
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leadership, regardless of what th- ,se orders might be. Although this researcher generally
agrees, to avoid discussion woil d be tantamount to what Admiral Miller called an
abdication of "our right and obligation to engage in and affect the public debate."93
Finally, some might question the appropriateness of an extensive discussion of the
traditional versus non-traditional missions issue in this thesis; after all, the subject is the
AJFP concept. There is good reason, however. Much of USACOM's initial AJFP menu is
focused on non-traditional missions, which has been the source, in turn, of much
criticism of AJFP.
This researcher has conclude'd that incorporating the range of new, non-traditional
tasks into the military's operational employment (and training) pallet will not
negatively impact, to any significant degree, the ability to meet traditional war-fighting
requirements and/or commitmeits. This conclusion is based on three primary reasons.
First, and as Admiral Miller has often pointed out, the forces that predominate in the
vast majority of these non-traditional operations will often not include front-line battle
weapons or combat personnel. They will generally be "supporting" forces, such as
construction or engineering units, medical personnel, logistics units, etc. In almost all
cases, the functions that these un its will perform in non-traditional-type operktions are
identical to the tasks they perform in traditional, combat scenarios. As such, the training
that they get forward "promoting peace" may actually improve their readiness for
"waging war." If nothing else, if and when they are needed for traditional, combat
contingencies, their participation in non-traditional operations overseas or domestically
may well put them in a better position to deploy rapidly, and arrive on-scene, ready to
operate immediately with maxim um effectiveness.
93Miller, Both Swords and Plowshares 1.
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It appears that the numbers of U.S. personnel that might be involved in non-
traditional military operations % ill be relatively small. For instance, even if the United
States were to be committed to a series of simultaneous such operations that
collectively, over the long term, included the deployment of, say, 30,000 troops, this
would constitute only a small percentage of the nation's active and reserve military
potential.94
Finally, with respect to planning and training for non-traditional military
operations, the end of the Cold War provides a window of opportunity for those
missions to take on greater importance. For example, if the totality of U.S. military
preparations were to be viewed as a typical pie graph, the Cold War pattern of training
and exercising might breakout w ith a very large (maybe 200 degree) wedge devoted to
preparing for global war, a somewhat smaller (perhaps 120 degree) wedge assigned to
fighting MRC-type conflicts, aid a quite diminutive (40 degree) slice for smaller
traditional, and non-tradtional contingencies (the percentages are included only for
rough, illustrative purposes). If it is assumed, for a moment, that previous planning for
MRCs was sufficient, and that the likelihood of global war has diminished to the point
that only a much smaller portion of the planning needs be focused there, then the result
is that a large wedge of "planning pie" has become available for something else.
Conceptually then, the kind oi detailed attention that AJFP envisions for smaller
traditional, and new non-traditional missions, is not misguided, nor does it necessarily
detract from the ability to plan and train for the larger, traditional, and truly combat
roles which define the military's ultimate purpose and responsibility.
941t is indicated however, that a large porcentage of the forces typically employed for such operations
(transport, logistics, communications, nmedical, etc.) reside in the reserves. As such, a series of significant
non-traditional missions might necessitate calling-up a number of non-active units, with all the possible
political fall-out that attends such decisions. Despite this note, the fact remains that such employment
would probably constitute only a relatively small portion of America's full active plus reserve military
potential.
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Another way to look at this issue of whether or not non-traditional roles and
missions detract from tradition. l war-fighting capability, is to examine more closely
those essential factors which most directly contribute to the U.S. military's advantage in
high-intensity combat operations. For starters, there is the advantage of owning the
world's most sophisticated, high-technology weapons, intelligence gathering, and
communications systems. With that in mind, it has been argued that, no matter how
many non-traditional missions are attempted, the military's fundamental procurement
strategies will not change; U.S. forces will continue to be equipped with the best. But of
arguably equal importance is DoD's vast logistics capability that in the 1991 Gulf War
enabled the United States to move a 600,000-strong force half-way around the world
and defeat a dug-in opponent decisively. Ironically, it appears that it is just this type of
logistics capability that is exercised most by the kind of non-traditional operations that
are now on-going, and contemplh ted for the future. 95
Also critical to the U.S. milit.iry's past and future success are its other fundamental
core-competencies, which include (in addition to combat operations and logistics) such
elements as operational planning, leadership, command, control, and communications,
reconnaissance and intelligence, etc. 96 It is precisely these competencies that seem to
suffer most, and are most difficult to exercise, during times of peace. As such, most of
the non-traditional missions in which American military units participate, will serve, if
nothing else, to exercise these core competencies in situations of stress and severe
unpredictability - something that can never quite be duplicated in "canned" training
exercises. Although clearly, that is not the primary purpose of such operations and
95This was the view articulated in Henry C. Stackpole and Erick Chase, "Humanitarian Intervention and
Disaster Relief: Projecting Military Strength Abroad to Save Lives," Marine Corps Gazette, February 1993,
18., which stated "in addition to the good accomplished in humanitarian relief, the planning and
execution of these missions serve 'double duty' by exercising fundamental military logistical capabilities."
96This concept of fundamental, core-competencies receives considerable coverage in both The Natnal
Mi liarStrah= and Admiral Miller's Both Swords and Plowshares.
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should not provide their underlying justification, it is side-benefit that cannot be
ignored.
This author concludes that no n-traditional use of our military forces is not, in and of
itself, wrong, or counter-productive to the Nation's fundamental goals and objectives.
To counter those who argue that such operations, if conducted overseas, divert limited
resources away from pressing domestic needs, it appears likely that most of the funding
for such missions would not otherwise be applied to solving America's serious social
and economic ills. Without goirig into a detailed description of the sources of, and
possible solutions to those ills, suffice it to say that for the most part, the problems of
poverty, crime, poor education, inadequate health security, etc., will not be aided even
marginally by the resources that now, or in the future, might be put toward
humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and/or nation-building efforts abroad. In large
measure, these ills appear to be less dependent on monetary resources, and more
appropriately addressed with fundamental changes to the Nation's social, political, and
legal systems.
In addition, it is clear that in the new international order, security does not equate
directly, or only, to traditional, war-fighting military security, whether against an
overwhelming, global opponent like the former Soviet Union, or a strong, possible
regional hegemon like Iraq or China. In other words, considering the world-wide
interdependence of the United States' own economic, political and social systems
overall, American national security is affected just as much by new, "unconventional"
threats as by the traditional military threats mentioned above. 97 This, added to both the
disappearance of the East-West confrontation, and the emergence of the United States as
the world's only true super-power, means, again, that a challenging, but crucial
window of opportunity has opened. This challenging window means that not only does
97These other, non-military challenges tc American security are outlined in George Bush, Nationai
Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 1.
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America now have the chance, it also has the requirement, to shape - rather than simply
react to - the international envi ronment upon which its prosperity (and security) is
becoming ever more dependent.
To put this line of reasoning a different way, and to paraphrase Admiral Miller, the
United States military's participation in activities that achieve, or contribute to, the
preenm tion of possible crises, advances the security of the American people just as
much as reacting to overt, de-facto military threats. Although Miller did not add the
following caveat, it is likely that he intended to imply it: it appears to be more efficient,
and ultimately less destructive a id costly to both the United States and the world as a
whole, if possible or likely crises can be prevented before their underlying causes fester
until they require an extremely costly Desert Storm-sized response. While the voices of
isolationism are strong in the Uniited States, and are often associated with calls to both
preclude the military's involvement in non-traditional roles and "let the Third World
take care of itself," those voices appear to be misguided - however patriotic they may
be.
While there seem to be good reasons, therefore, for using America's military forces
for non-traditional missions, and for implementing more formal preparations for such
employment (like AJFP), certain caveats are nevertheless in order. For starters, it cannot
be said with absolute certainty that assigning forces to such non-traditional operations,
and developing training regimes accordingly, will not affect the military's overall
capacity to carry-out traditiornal war-fighting roles. America's national security
leadership must, instead, commit themselves to ensuring that such operations and
training practices do not, in fact, degrade traditional capabilities. In other words,
American military superiority is not automatic or inevitable, and must be pursued
continually, deliberately, and with determination. The military's top commanders must
test themselves and their forces regularly in as realistic a manner as possible, so as to
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constantly ensure themselves of the capability to conduct the type of large and small-
scale conventional combat operations that remain their primary mission.
This researcher agrees with critics who propose that a large number of overseas,
internal and multi-national conflicts are inappropriate for the introduction of American
or UN military forces. Not only is the use of force unlikely to solve the fundamental
roots of some of these conflicts, it often serves only to exacerbate those roots. This is not
to say that all peacekeeping, peacemaking and/or nation-building challenges abroad
are immune to the application of military force, either alone or in concert with political,
economic and social initiatives - they are not. Yet caution should be the order of the day
when deciding where and when the United States should commit its military resources.
This caution is not so much a function of limited military resources, but of the limited
political capital that is necessary to commit those resources. In other words, the Nation's
political capital ought to be (indeed nDs to be) rationed, and spent where it has the
best chance of success and the greatest likelihood for generating tangible benefits. To do
otherwise would result in an American people, an American military establishment,
and an American legislature increasingly opposed to non-traditional employment of its
armed forces, including those cases where they =an make a difference.
In the final measure however, and regardless of the "below-the-surface" internal
DoD debate over traditional versus non-traditional roles and missions, the military will
be responsible for carrying out the orders of the Nation's civilian leadership. In
response to what appear to be the trend of those orders - i.e. toward increased
participation of the U.S. military in such operations - military leadership have clearly
commited themselves accordingly. Certainly, that is the sense of virtually all recent
official statements coming out of the JCS, the individual services, and the Unified
CINCs.98 All things being equal in the range of new, non-traditional challenges in which
98This commitment can best be summed-up by quoting the Air Force's 1990 white paper GoaRach
GlobalP••!.r, which indicated that the military's capability to participate in non-traditional missions "...
provides a tool for building trust and confidence and spreading goodwill around the world," and allows
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the U.S. military may participate, tocused force-packaging and mission-specific, pre-
crisis training initiatives such as AJFP seem to hold out the promise of a considerable
pay-off.
D. YET MORE ON THE THEODORE ROOSEVELTISPMAGTF
It is particularly important to a--in point-out that AJFP includes, as a subset,
adaptive nayal force packaging inLitiaL.ves, the first "official" iteration of which was the
deployment of the Theodore Roosevelt ;,-d its embarked SPMAGTF. While the almost
purely naval flavor of this preliminary AJFP experiment may be due, in part, to the
naval flavor of the "old" Atlantic Command itself, it is surely also a reflection of the
inherent limitations and difficulties (outlined above) associated with using non-naval
force units for flexible, basing-constrained forward presence operations. As well, it is
also probably an indication of the previously discussed immediacy of the forward
presence/naval asset shortage problem. In any case, and despite the many concerns and
criticisms associated with this particular naval force packaging concept, a closer look is
warranted.
As indicated, a number of criticisms have been aimed at the Theodore
Roosevelt/SPMAGTF deployment. To restate them again for clarity, on? cited the
possible long-term negative impacts on the Marine Corps' MEU-related doctrine should
the concept become a model for future deployments. A second deplored the fact that the
600-man Marine Corps unit which was put aboard the carrier lacked the same strong,
multi-mission capability and sustainability of a traditional, full up MEU. It arguably fell
short of even the limited capability with which the smaller unit was advertised. Other
critics claimed that the downsizing of the CV's embarked airwing was unnecessary and
even counter-productive, while some argued that there are probably better, more
"the United States to influence events important to our national security and the security of the free
world."
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appropriate ways to provide the same capabilities without unconventional packaging.
And finally, there were those who did not understand why the new force packaging
exercise was staged to begin with.
These criticisms can be partially addressed by providing a clearer explanation of
what appear to be the fundamental, underlying reasons for the CV/SPMAGTF's
implementation. If the critical statements published most recently in the Navy Times99
are an accurate indication, then it seems that the relevant planners either did not explain
their reasons, or simply did not get their message across. The following is this
researcher's interpretation of the reasoning behind the CV/SPMAGTF concept. It is
followed, in turn, by an analysis of the possible relevance, viability, and likelihood of
such force packaging initiatives for future deployments.
Assume, for the sake of discussion, that the Navy does not have any resource
problems, in other words, that it will, for the forseeable future, continue to have enough
aircraft carriers and large-deck amphibious assault ships to provide one of each, year-
round, to all of the overseas CINCs that want them. This would mean, for example, that
EUCOM (and/or CENTCOM) will always have both a CVBG and a MARG, in their
respective AORs. Assume also, however, that the overseas operating environment ha
in fact changed; that relatively speaking, the prospect of missions at the lower end of the
spectrum, including new, non-traditional missions, has replaced the Cold War scenario
of deterring and being ready to fight the former Soviet Union.
Given these circumstances, a fundamental choice presents itself with regard to
deployed CVs. Either a traditional CVBG (with a Cold War-mix airwing) plus a
standard MARG may be deployed, or the Theodore Roosevelt-type composition can be
selected (with a downsized airwing, a marginally less capable MARG, and a small,
limited-capability SPMAGTF aboard the CV). If the traditional set-up is chosen, and the
"
9Chris Lawson, "Home! Six-Month Experiment Laid to Rest as Roosevelt Returns," N=axy Times, 20
September 1993,3.
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theater CINC wishes to have both the air capability of the carrier's airwing and the
ground capability of the Marines. both the CVBG and the MARG must be present. With
the new configuration, however, the MARG may go-off on its own (either for training,
for libery, for showing the flag, or for some real-world contingency) and the carrier-
centered force will still have some "green" capability (embodied in the SPMAGTF),
albeit much more limited than trie full MARG. The cost of that flexibility, of course, is
the loss of the aircraft that are excluded to make room for the CV-embarked Marine
contingent, and (if the SPMAGTF is taken directly from the MEU) a somewhat less
capable MARG.
In this scenario, with both a carrier and a large amphibious assault ship available,
the question revolves around Ahat the regional commander wants or thinks he will
need. Does he want the dozen or so extra aircraft that the non-SPMAGTF option offers,
plus the requirement to bring the LHA or LH-.) to bear any time he needs even limited
Marine capability? Or is he willing to forego those dozen aircraft, and possibly accept a
less potent MARG, in order to put some Marine capability aboard the CV that allows
his MARG to go-off and operate independently? Considering the fundamental changes
in the overseas operating environment, with multiple hot-spots and diverse missions at
the lower end of the spectrum replacing conflict with the Soviet Union as the planning
norm, the apparent, underlying rationale for the CV/SPMAGTF concept seems to be
sound.
It seems important at this point to note that, although it was not introduced it as
such, the asset-rich scenario (analogous to the context in which the Theodore Roosevelt
and the S were both deployed simultaneously) primarily represents a case of
doing things more effectively with the same "old" set of deployable assets. Conversely,
it hardly seems representative of a move to do things more efficiently, as will be
demanded by a reduction of overall deployable assets and the requirement to
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occasionally deploy either a CV centered task force, or a force built around a large-deck
amphibious assault ship - but not both.
As such, a second scenario should be introduced. In this case, a smaller force-
structure and relatively firm Perstempo limitations ensure that Q a CV is available to
the regional CINC. Although, as indicated, the Theodore Roosevelt was deployed along
with a MARG in the traditional fashion, it appears that the days of only one or the other
being available may be at hand. In fact,considering that CVBG and MARG coverages
are already being gapped, it appears that this situation has already arrived.1°° If only a
CV is available, the regional CINC is faced with a choice similar to, but more pressing
than that outlined in the preceeding scenario. Does he want his carrier to have the
traditional full complement of aircraft, without an afloat capability to do, say, a NEO or
hostage rescue operation? Or is he willing to reduce the airwing's complement
marginally to allow the embarkation of a SPMAGTF that might afford that option.
Again, the choice revolves around the question of which tasks (or capabilities) are most
likely to be in demand. Given the changing face of military force employment patterns,
the CV/SPMAGTF option appears to provide a flexibility and versatility that traditional
CVBG force compositions cannot furnish..
Considering the number and heated nature of the criticisms articulated with respect
to the Theodore Roosevelt deployment, especially those which questioned the basic
"why" behind it, it may be that the Atlantic Command planners involved in the
development of the CV/SPMAGTF concept did not sufficiently publicize these hard
and fast choices. Alternatively, it may be that the intended audience was simply not
willing face-up to the different operating environment and smaller force structure that
100An estimate of the degree to which this will happen depends on who is providing the estimate, and on
what planning assumptions are made with regard to deployment lengths, turn-around times, tethers,
PERSTEMPO guidelines, etc. For a "number-crunching" analysis of the CV problem, see Ronald
OlRourke, Naval Forward Deployments and the Size of the Navy CRS Report for Congress, (Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1992).
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now demand change. The latter, "blinders" argument is the one offered by most
USACOM planners.
It is only fair to take an even closer look at one particular criticism aimed at this
preliminary force packaging initiative, namely the argument that there are better and
more appropriate ways to provide the kind of task-capability that was advertised for
the CV/SPMAGTF option. This argument was articulated not only by the Marine
Corps, but also by the "user" Unified Command, EUCOM itself. Conversations with
EUCOM staff officers indicated that they would have preferred to rely on other in-
theater rapid-reaction forces (the Army units at Vicenza, Italy for example) for
responding quickly to hostage rescue, NEO, and/or Search and Rescue (SAR)
contingencies. Part of the rationale for that assesment focused on the truly specialized
training and equipment needed for such operations - especially if conducted in a "non-
permissive" or hostile environment.10 1 The Marine Corps SPMAGTF unit on-board the
Theodore Roosevelt was considered not adequately prepared, or equipped, for such
missions, and therefore not worth the costs of limiting the capability of its parent
Marine battalion aboard the MARG or the aircraft carrier's airwing.
This author is not in a position to referee the claims made about the SPMAGTF's
relative capability, or the avowed advantages of using more specialized, land-based
forces for that capability. In partial support of the CV/SPMAGTF choice, however, it is
important to note the advantage of afloat forces, insofar as they do not have the host-
nation consent problems associated with most overseas land-based units.
In summary however, it is probably important to emphasize that force packaging
decisions may need to be the responsibility of the theater Unified CINCs, i.e. the
ultimate users. The individual services (in the CV/SPMAGTF case the Navy and
101 For a thorough discussion of the demands of hostage rescue operations see Richard F. Brauer,
"Planning for Hostage Rescue Missions. A Critical Examination," Esays on Strateg. (Washinglon, D.C.:
National Defense University Press, 1985), 1-38.
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Marine Corps) ought not be the final arbiters in whether one packaging option is
selected in favor of another. Their opinions are of course important, especially as
regards an estimation of the actual capabilities of the various force package alternatives,
but those opinions should be limited to just that.
Similarly, USACOM and the CJCS will also need to play a role, in particular, for
deciding the range of options available and prioritizing multiple AOR demands. But,
again, that role should not extend to making the final decision on which package to
select from the available menu. In the end, the hard decisions appear to be most
appropriately made by the supported CINCs who are assigned overall command of
those forces, and who are ultimately responsible for supporting and defending
American objectives and interests abroad. While it is perhaps unfortunate that their
voice has not been heard p2ublicly vis a vis AJFP, it is equally important to note that,
below the surface, their input has been vociferous and to the point. As regards the
CV/SPMAGTF packaging alternative, EUCOM and NAVEUR are reported to have
recently rejected that option for regular, repetetive deployments.10 2
In conclusion, it is necessary to introduce the package configuration that was
chosen for the Theodore Roosevelt's successor in the Mediterranean, the America
battlegroup. Also important are the most recent developments regarding its
deployment. Taken together, they provide what may be an accurate indication of the
future of this particular naval subset of adaptive joint force packaging.
The America was also deployed with a small detatchment of Marines aboard,
although the size and make-up of the force was reduced considerably. To be specific,
the carrier's "green" contingent included only about 250 Marines and four helicopters
(less than half of the Theodore Roosevelt's complement).10 3 Interestingly, the name and
102While the official rejection of the CV 'SPMAGTF option for routine, repetetive deployments was
spelled-out in non-public, "personal for" messages sent between the four-stars (unavailable, of course, to
this researcher), their basic substance was offered in unofficial telephone conversations.
103Chris Lawson, "Home! Six-Month Experiment Laid to Rest as Roosevelt Returns," NaulL 20
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organizational relationships of America's cross-decking operation were changed as
well. The Marine contingent was no longer called a SPMAGTF, but was referred to
instead as a MEU "detatchment." In contrast with the Theodore Roosevelt episode,
when the SPMAGTF was incorporated formally into the carrier's internal command
structure, the America detachment was apparently considered "on temporary loan"
from the MARG to the carrier force. Although the fundamental catalyst is unclear at this
point (i.e. resulting either from EUCOM's direct order, or the MARG's own initiative)
the Marine detatchment aboard the America was recently withdrawn, and returned to
its place within the G MARG organization deployed simultaneously.
It appears, therefore, that the future of placing large detachments of Marines aboard
regularly deployed aircraft carriers is, at this point, uncertain at best. If nothing else,
these deployments demonstrated that this particular AJFP option "can be done." They
have also amassed a library of corporate knowledge and lessons learned that should
prove extremely helpful should such a mixed-force package be needed in the future.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
If the Armed Forces are to serve the Nation in confronting the challenges that lie ahead,
perceptions of a military unable or unwilling to entertain any idea which is not supported by a
concensus of all the services must be put to rest now and forever. The world is changing and it is
time for the military to do the same thtrough reform that goes beyond Goldwater-Nichols.
(Peter W. Chiarelli, in joint Force Ouarterly.)
In the introductory chapter of this thesis, it was argued that a thorough, unbiased
examination of adaptive joint force packaging was needed. In doing so, the next two
chapters in the thesis presented the respective cases for and against AJFP. Although not
every possible detail of the arguments could be presented, it is hoped that the coverage
was fair, accurate, and robust enough to provided readers with a clearer picture of what
AJFP is and may become, as well as of the claims made by both champions and critics.
Because the initiative incorporates so many factors and objectives and continues to
change and evolve almost daily, "real time" analysis was often difficult. Nevertheless,
some predominant themes emerged. Some of these themes - doing things better at the
lower-end of the military spectrum, providing forward presence with lower levels of
naval assets, traditional versus non-traditional missions, and the first real-world
iterations of AJFP - were presented in Chapter IV.
This chapter closes the discussion with some general conclusions. Before doing so
however, it is important to note that AJFP, regardless of whatever advantages and
disadvantages it might have, has been ado1ted. In other words, it, and the other
fundamental changes involved with the stand-up of USACOM have already been
enacted into law. With that in mind, plus the fact that much of AJFP remains a
preliminary, evolving set of theoretical ideas with very few real-world data-points, the
following conclusions are not provided with an eye toward rigidly accepting or
rejecting the concept of adaptive joint force packaging as a whole. Official decisions
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have obviously already been made. Instead, the following discussion merely makes
some general observations about the applicability of AJFP (i.e. what it can and cannot
do), as well as about the problems it is likely to encounter on its way toward full
implementation.
A. CHANGES ARE NEEDED.
It evident that the United States military force structure will be significantly smaller
in the future. that, But this alone does not warrant an automatic shift in the way
America's armed forces do business. Clearly, the primary threat for which much of that
force structure was built has changed. It co, ild therefore be argued that the smaller force
structure merely reflects a demise the Soviet threat, and does not call for a fundamental
revision to the military's peacetime and wartime mode of operations.
However, the change in the security environment is not limited only to a new, non-
hostile relationship with the old global adversary. Instead, and ironically due in part to
that new relationship, the future environment also portends greater instability and
unrest worldwide. This specter has has precipitated the well-publicized shift toward
preparations for missions at the lower-end of the military-use spectrum. Unfortunately,
this is precisely the types of small-scale contingencies for which the U.S. military
appears least prepared. It follows that the need for new planning and training processes
for smaller-scale missions is fundamentally a function of the changing external security
environment, and less so of force reductions. AJFP is one attempt to address the need to
do things better at the lower end of the military-use spectrum.
There is another aspect to the need for change. The increased instability and unrest
of the new international environment demand the continued peacetime presence of
American forces overseas. This appears especially true of the regions outside of the U.S.
Cold War focus of Central Europe and the Korean Peninsula. Such presence is still
considered essential to prevent conflicts, diffuse them before they get out of hand, or
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respond to them quickly with potent military force if the need arises. In contrast to the
need to plan and train better for smaller-scale crisis response missions, the necessity for
providing robust forward presence is affected directly by on-going force drawdowns.
As indicated previously, the forces at issue are the Navy aircraft carriers and large-
deck amphibious assault ships that have traditionally provided regular presence in and
about many of the world's regions. Despite general recognition that the demand for
forward picesence remains high, the number of major naval assets available to do the job
is being reduced however. Given that this trend is not likely to be reversed for the time
being, AJFP explores ways to supplement the forward presence capability supplied by
the remaining CVs and LHAs/LHDs. AJFP proposes to do so, in part, through the
innovative packaging of forces from all the services, including the Army and the Air
Force.
B. GREATER EFFECTIVENESS AT THE LOWER-END OF THE SPECTRUM.
It is concluded that AJFP =n significantly improve the ability of the U.S. military to
respond effectively to contingencies at the lower-end of the military-use spectrum. It
could be said that, considering the previous practice of devoting only very limited
attention to smaller-scale contingencies, almost waa. plan to address them more
thoroughly will help. In much the same way that hostage rescue and amphibious
assault missions require specialized equipment and training, the tasks associated with
this lower-end of the spectrum demand commanders and associated staffs with
specialized training and focused exercise experience. While this applies to both
traditional and non-traditional missions, it seems especially true for the latter, as that
category has received even less attention over the past decades.
C. SUPPLEMENTING NAVAL PRESENCE WITH JOINTNESS
AJFP envisions a series of "joint" packaging options to help compensate for lower,
post-Cold War numbers of major naval assets that remain the foundation of the
94
continuous forward presence mission in many regions of the world. Although some of
these options intend only to "enhance" naval presence when a CVBG and/or a MARG
is available and on-scene, others are designed as situtes. While the first objective is
commendable and worthy of continued investment, the second appears to address the
real challenge of forward presence more squarely. The catch is that the "old" naval
packages have simultaneously fulfilled a number of different roles while deployed
overseas, and have fulfilled them in a particular, some would argue unique, way. Those
simultaneous roles included deterring potential aggressors, assuring friends and allies,
securing needed foreign-soil access, and providing an on-scene rapid crisis response
capability.
It is the opinion of this author that AJFP packages, including those built primarily
around Army and/or Air Force units can go along way toward replacing CVBGs and
MARGs when naval asset-availablility precludes the presence of those standard
formations. Of course, this may require some changes on the part of the Army and Air
Force. In particular, it may require these services to enhance their ability to deploy
small, multi-capability, limited "tail" packages to under-developed basing sites, and the
either disperse them, or move them around once in-theater. If that can be done, and if
the necessary access can be negotiated, it appears that ground-based forces can, to a
large extent, create the kind of region-wide deterrence, assurance, and access
historically provided by naval formations.
As indicated in an earlier chapter, such land-based presence may even be able to
deter and assure better, insofar as their ashore positioning may actually send a
somewhat stronger signal of American commitment and resolve than afloat forces. Of
course, that perception of greater U.S. commitment is something that American policy
makers must consider when deciding whether or not to implement such alternative,
non-naval forward presence options. In other words, in the absence of formal, long-term
defensive alliances and explicit security guarantees with the nations on whose soil
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Army and Air Force units would be placed, it may not not be prudent to accept the
possible, inadvertant implications of alliance and guarantee that such options may
convey.
The above noted concerns aside, there is an additional factor to consider with
respect to using Army and Air Force units in regions not normally patrolled by ground-
based forces. Deploying Air Force composite air wings or Army airborne forces to these
regions would provide them with opprtunities to train in "unfamiliar" areas, and
exercise with non-NATO international armed forces. In view of the argument that those
regions are the most likely locales of future U.S. force employment, and that ad hoc
international coalitions will likely be used much more often in the future, then it may be
that more operational experience with such regions and multi-national forces is an
overall positive step for both the Army and the Air Force.
With respect to the other articulated mission of forward positioned forces, i.e.
providing an on-scene rapid response capability, the option of substituting naval forces
with ground-based forces may have some significant constraints that need to be
considered. Specifically, the afloat nature of naval forces gives them the ability to project
American military power unilaterally, without the operational limitations associated
with foreign-soil basing and host-nation concerns. While it may be possible to negotiate
access agreements for temporary, peacetime Army and Air Force deployments, total
U.S. freedom of action is not likely to be acharacteristic of those agreements. As such, no
matter how technically capable Army and Air Force replacements for CVBGs and
MARGs may be, they will not always be able to respond when and where the NCA
wishes them to. This does not mean that such replacements should be rejected out of
hand; it only proposes that U.S decision-makers must consider the ramifications of
possible host-nation constraints when weighing their forward presence, foreign policy
options and alternatives.
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D. NON-TRADITIONAL MISSIONS ARE "OK"
Chapter IV argued the importance and appropriateness of American military forces
being applied to non-traditional or non-combat missions like peacekeeping,
humanitarian relief, nation-building, disaster relief, etc. That conclusion was based on
four primary considerations. First, it was argued that such missions do not necessarily
detract from the military's ability to conduct traditional combat missions. It was pointed
out that relatively few American forces would probably be so employed, and that, as a
"bonus," fundamental military core competencies would be exercised in the course of
such operations. It was also argued that if the resources which go into such operations
were not so spent, they would not necessarily be diverted to address the Nation's
domestic social and economic problems. And finally, it was argued also that the new,
post-Cold War security environment portends a range of economic, political and social
instabilities that may be as dangerous, in the long run, to American national security as
"traditional" military threats. As such, the idea of using U.S. military forces to respond
to such non-traditional challenges is not outside the defining purpose of the Nation's
armed forces.
Given the case for non-traditional missions for U.S. forces, more deliberate
preparations is a logical next-step. Clearly, American military forces have had, prior to
the past few years, relatively little experience with the types of operations and contacts
with non-military, non-U.S. organizations that these new missions require. Probably
because those missions were less likely in the past, they did not receive a great deal of
focused planning and training. USACOM, through its AJFP concept, intends to change
that situation, and in the process, promises to increase the effectiveness of operations
directed at these new missions.
Alongside the above noted argument, it was nevertheless remarked that not all non-
traditional challenges are appropriate for U.S. military participation. It was pointed out
that some situations are simply unsolvable by outside intervention, while others may be
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more appropriately addressed with diplomatic and economic initiatives vice military
forces. As such, America's leadership must make some hard choices about which
challenges it will take on, and w hen and where it will respond to those challenges by
deploying its armed forces. Thus, advocacy for applying American military forces to
what Admiral Miller calls "forward looking" missions does not come without
reservations.
E. EXCESSIVE FOCUS ON NON-TRADITIONAL MISSIONS
While is often desireable that U.S. forces participate in and train for non-traditional
military missions, there is a risk that the initial AJFP menu is overly preoccupied with
those missions. Specifically, that menu may not provide enough attention to the wide-
range of traditional, combat missions that remain at the lower-end of the spectrum.
While the vast diversity of potential non-traditional situations might clearly justify each
of the nine non-traditional packages in the menu, there remains an equally large
diversity of smaller-scale combat missions that are in need of tailored packages and
mission-specific JTF training.
As indicated earlier, the initial menu does, in fact, include a number of packages
that might be considered as designed for traditional military tasks, notably Non-
Combatant Evacuation Operations, No-Fly Zone Enforcement, Quarantine or Blockade,
and Forward Presence. But this short list fails to incorporate other typical combat tasks
like invading and occupying a small island nation, bombing the strategic targets of
some other small nation, or even defending an ally or non-aligned country from hostile
take-over by a small, but more powerful and aggressive neighbor. These are missions
that are also worthy of the kind of force packaging and JTF training that AJFP envisions.
While it is as yet unclear exactly how soon AJFP planners will get around to
developing packages for these other likely, traditional military tasks (or even if they
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intend, ultimately, to do so), their exclusion at this point appears to be one of the major
shortcomings of the AJFP process to date.
F. THE CUSTOMER IS KING.
It appears that the overseas theater CINCs ought to be the ones who make the final
decisions about which force pacl ages will be deployed to their AORs, be it for forward
presence or to respond to specific crises. After all, they are the ones who will employ the
force packages, and who will be responsible for the success or failure ultimately
achieved. This is not to say, however, that the CJCS and the Joint Staff, the Services, and
the force-providing CINCs should have no say in the matter. On the contrary, these
organizations will certainly determine the menu of force package options made
available to the overseas CINCs. They will inevitably play this role on account of their
in-depth knowledge and understanding of the resources (the basic force building-
blocks) that are available over the long-run, and at any one particular time.
The CJCS and the Joint Staff. in particular, will need to exercise their coordination
and oversight function, especially when multiple CINCs are demanding packages
simultaneously and not enough of the most requested types exist. To put it bluntly, the
CJCS and his staff (in conjuction with USACOM, obviously) will be forced to prioritize
the various overseas CINC's demands, and allocate the available resources accordingly.
To add one additional caveat to this idea of user-CINCs choosing the force packages, it
may be necessary, at times, to merge the desires of multiple theater CINCs into a single,
articulate requirement. This applies most notably to the packages that will be deployed
for peacetime forward presence. This is due to the fact that forward presence packages
often rotate through more than one AOR during a single deployment. The apparent
need to coordinate and conclude which force package best meets the coeive needs of
multiple overseas CINCs may have been the driving force behind USACOM's call for
regular, semi-annual, forward presence scheduling conferences to be attended by
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representatives from the force p-'oviders, the overseas force users, the Joint Staff, and
the Services.
In the end, however, the theater combatant commanders who are to employ
adaptive joint force packages m~i. be the ones who make a final selection from the list
of available options. They are .urelv the ones who best understand the particular
conditions of the environment in which the force packages will operate.
Q A CAPABILITIES "DICTIONARY" IS NEEDED
One of the most notable deficiencies blocking the successful implementation of
AJFP appears to be the lack of a c.ommon set of terms for the supporting and supported
CINCs to carry-out the new system of capabilities-based force allocation. As indicated
earlier, the recently finalized UJTL is simply not adequate for soliciting and selecting
forces for particular, individual crises or forward presence requirements. Nor was it
designed to do that. Nevertheless, a list of common, capabilities-based terms is needed
for AJFP to work, and the JMET1I system has been indicated as the logical place to start.
Adapting it to the needs of AJFP is a task that must be pursued and accomplished
before the full potential of adaptive force packaging can be realized.104
H. A DESIGNATED -JOINT FORCE INTEGRATOR" WILL HELP
The United States has been trying to get its armed forces to work together as a joint
team for many years. Major initiatives toward this end include the National Security
Act of 1947, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act passed in 1986. Although "jointness"
appears to have improved remarkably in the past few years, success in this endeavor
has, by most accounts, been less than total. In the mind of this researcher, one probable
cause for the lack of success has been the diffusion of responsibility and accountability
for making jointness happen. In other words, the mandate for getting the individual
1041n a telephone interview conducted just prior to the completion of this thesis, USACOM planners
indicated that this was one of the major remaining obstacles to the realization of AJFP.
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services to work together has, Until now, been spread-out across the Services, the
Unified and Specified CINCs, and the CJCS and Joint Staff. Like planning and training
for the lower-end of the military -use spectrum, jointness appears to have consistently
taken a back seat to the affairs of the day. For the Services, organizing, training and
equipping their individual, service-specific fleets, air forces and armies took precedence,
while for theater CINCs, achieving the day-to-day containment of the Soviet Union and
dealing with the odd assorted crisis only occasionally required close, highly coordinated
contact. Even if problems with joint interoperability were revealed during those
occasions, no one organization seems to have been able, on its own, to correct the
weaknesses. In the end, if jointness did not occur, as it did not, each could blame the
other. Now, USACOM and its Commander in Chief are officially responsible and
accountable for making jointness happen. Should it not, the accusing fingers will all
point in one direction.
It could be argued that the CJCS, by virtue of the expansive powers given him by
the Goldwater-Nichols Act, was not only responsible for jointness, but also in a position
to make it happen. Unfortunately, joint interoperability is only a very small portion of
the Chairman and Joint Staff's ditties. Because their day to day contact with, and power
over, the actual forces is minimal, and because their attentions are inevitably tied-up
with the politics of Washington, it was probably unrealistic to expect the CJCS and his
staff to, themselves, put jointness in-place. Unfortunately, no other single organization
appears to have had the power to do it either. This has changed. Not only does
USACOM have the responsibility, it also has the necessary power. To be specific, it has
direct command over major elements of all four services, in-CONUS and in peacetime -
something which is required to make the process work, but which has not been
available before.
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L DOD-WIDE COOPERATION IS ESSENTIAL
Despite the above discussion. which pointed to USACOM having both the incentive
and much of the wherewithal to make jointness a reality, the goal of having the different
services operate together more effectively is by no means assured. In other words,
despite USACOM's direct control over FORSCOM, ACC, MARFORLANT, and
LANTFLT, the individual services and the overseas theater CINCs will still have
considerable power to affect future Atlantic Command efforts - if not to completely
derail them, then at least to make their realization somewhat more difficult. Fortunately,
as noted earlier, each of the Services and Unified CINCs have recently produced public
policy statements that clearly claim a determined commitment to realizing a new and
substantially expanded level of jointness.
Nevertheless, there must be a recognition of the fact that similar statements were
produced at the time of Goldwater-Nichols, and that the desired jointness did not
develop. As well, a certain pragmatism (or healthy skepticism) must accompany the
stand-up of USACOM, and the fact that that development places a great deal of real
power in the hands of a single organization and a single Unified CINC. As such, it may
very well exacerbate the pulling and hauling that marks the relationship among the
military's top four-stars officers. Whether any resentment will thus be created between
those four-stars, or whether any "passive resistance" will in-turn result, is impossible to
say. It is a factor that must, however, be considered, especially in view of the previous
problems encountered with implementing jointness. Ultimately, it will be up to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense to make sure that all elements
within the defense establishment are on-board, and making a concerted effort to
support USACOM's new joint force integrator role.
In addition, the activities included in USACOM's new functions - consolidating
major elements of all four Services, joint training and exercising, and developing and
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deploying joint force packages - do not necessarily encompass the entirety of what is
considered necessary to achieve jointness. Other relevant measures include coordinated
procurement practices, formalized joint doctrine, and joint education at the lowest
levels. While USACOM can push for, and have an impact on, these other steps, it does
not have the overall responsibility for them, or the direct power needed for their
implementation. As such, even if the Atlantic Command is highly successful with its
new missions, jointness cannot be fully realized unless these other activities are pursued
as well.
With respect to AJFP specifically, cooperation and commitment are also needed
from the non-USACOM organizations. Despite the official, October 1993 adoption of the
Atlantic Command's new mandate, the old system of force requesting and providing
seems to linger. Conversations with staff officers involved in the recent deployment of
additional forces to Somalia indicated that USACOM was provided with a hard and fast
list of forces that were to be deployed, versus a list of required capabilities, as is the
intended procedure envisioned for the capabilities-based AJFP. Therefore, it appears
that much of USACOM's vision has yet to be put into practice. If that vision is the "right
thing to do," and its official adoption via the USACOM I-Plan indicates that the nation's
leadership feels it is, then the Joint Staff and the overseas theater CINCs may need to
devote more attention, and more commitment, to getting on-board.
In the end, however, the final test of success will only come with actual, real-world
military operations, especially those types of smaller, highly integrated operations
against determined foes that demand an extra measure of jointness and an added
degree of prior planning and exercising. As such, it would be ideal to revisit this thesis
and its AJFP topic a few years hence, in order to examine the level of success generated
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